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Machine Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies

Cybersecurity is an increasingly important challenge for computer systems.
In this work, cyberattacks were modeled using an extension of the well-known Petri
net formalism. That formalism, designated Petri nets with players, strategies, and
costs, models the states of the cyberattack and events during the attack as markings
and transition firings in the net respectively. The formalism models the attacker
and defender as competing players who may observe the marking of a subset of
the net and based on the observed marking act by changing the stochastic firing
rates of a subset of the transitions in order to achieve their competing goals. Rate
changes by the players incur a cost. Using the formalism, nets were constructed to
model three specific cyberattack patterns (cross-site scripting, spear phishing, and
structured query language injection) documented in the Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification database. The models were validated by a panel of
cybersecurity experts in a structured face validation process.
Given those validated nets, a reinforcement learning algorithm using an eGreedy policy was implemented and set to the task of learning which actions to take,
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i.e., which transition rates to change for the di↵erent observable markings, so as to
accomplish the goals of the attacker or defender. Experiments were conducted with a
dynamic (learning) attacker against a static (fixed) defender, a static attacker against
a dynamic defender, and a dynamic attacker against a dynamic defender. In all cases,
the reinforcement learning algorithm was able to improve its performance, in terms
of achieving the player’s objective and reducing the cost of doing so, over time. These
results demonstrate the potential of formally modeling cyberattacks and of applying
reinforcement learning to improving cybersecurity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research is what I’m doing
when I don’t know what I’m doing.
—Wernher von Braun
1.1

What is Cybersecurity?
Cybersecurity is a growing area of concern. From the Office of Personnel

Management data breach to the Stuxnet cyberweapon, many people are being a↵ected
by failures in cybersecurity. Countries are being compromised and individuals are
having their identity stolen at alarming rates. Presently, models of cyberdefense
techniques lack accurate prediction capabilities and are unable to present decision
makers with the means to interpret and understand vulnerabilities in their computer
systems. This creates two di↵erent situations; either the systems remain unsecure
and vulnerable, or the systems are over protected, reducing system performance and
capabilities. Both of these scenarios could be remediated if the managers could better
understand the associated risks and likelihood of events. Furthermore, managers need
to be able to quickly identify areas that they can directly influence and change as
opposed to developing policies and procedures for events that are beyond their control.

1

This dissertation describes research to model cyberattacks and apply machine learning
algorithms to determine attack and defense strategies.
In an e↵ort to solve the problem of creating e↵ective policies and implementable strategies, research needs to be done to model a cyberattack in a concise
and understandable manner. This research used an extension of Petri nets to model
a cyberattack on a particular computer system. Then, using that Petri net-based
model of a computer system, a form of machine learning known as reinforcement
learning was used to develop better strategies for cyberattack and cyberdefense on
that system. I developed and implemented a cyberattack simulator to test a reinforcement learning algorithm to explore policy changes and the e↵ects they had on
the computer system’s vulnerability to cyberattacks.

1.2

What are Petri Nets?
An attack vector is a method that an attacker may utilize in order to ex-

ploit a system. One of the more difficult aspects of identifying a computer system’s
weaknesses is determining likely attack vectors. If an attack vector is successful, an
attacker gains access or information that the system owner did not intend to divulge.
In identifying attack vectors, cybersecurity experts have multiple ways of expressing
them.
An attack graph can represent states of a system as nodes. Nodes are connected to each other by transitions. Each transition in the attack graph represents
a path that leads to a new system state. Eventually the graph will lead to the end
state of a compromised system. Attack trees are another method of identifying at2

tack vectors and determining the methods of exploit. Attack trees are a specific type
of attack graph that are implemented as directed acyclic graphs. In the attack tree,
each node represents a step that must be completed in order to compromise a system.
The nodes are joined using AND/OR logical gates. The gates indicate that either all
attached nodes must be completed, or at least one must be completed in order for
that level to be true. The end goal, or exploit of the system, is the root node of the
tree.
The Petri net formalism was originally described in the dissertation research
of Carl Petri in 1962 [1], [2]. A Petri net is a special form of a weighted bipartite
directed graph. It allows for the mathematical and graphical modeling of a process
using two di↵erent elements, places and transitions. Places represent conditions and
transitions represent events. Arcs link places to transitions and transitions to places
and can be weighted. To indicate the current state of the net, tokens may be present
in places. Any place that has a token is considered marked [2].
In order for a transition to be enabled, i.e., eligible to fire, all of the places with
arcs leading to the transition must be marked with, i.e., contain, at least as many
tokens as weight of the arc connecting the place to the transition. If any one place is
not marked, then the transition cannot fire. An enabled transition may or may not
fire, based on whether or not the event occurred. The firing of the transition consumes
the tokens from the input places by the amount of the weighted arc. In addition to
consuming the tokens, the firing adds tokens to all output places connected to the
transition per the connecting arcs’ weights [2].
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This basic definition of the Petri net is extended by Zakrzewska [3] to represent competing players, their awareness of the system’s state, and their strategies for
accomplishing their goals. This is important to represent a cyberattack in a more
realistic setting. An attack does not occur on its own. At least two players have to
be present, an attacker and defender. There can be additional players, but in this
research, we restricted ourselves to those two roles. In addition to adding players,
Zakrzewska introduces two di↵erent types of transitions. These transitions are categorized as player-controlled or stochastic. The player-controlled transition rates are
determined by the player’s strategy. This strategy can change the rates based on the
current observable marking of the PNPS. This represents the actions that a player
can willfully choose to make, such as starting a particular type of attack. Stochastic transitions are defined by rates that represent the actions that are outside of a
player’s control. As an example, the detection of an occurring attack should not be
player-controlled. Otherwise a defender would always choose to detect an attack and
an attacker would always choose that the attack be undetected. Additionally, Zakrzewska’s PNPSs allow for modeling incomplete information. The attacker has no
idea if they have been detected, and will continue to attack until they have exhausted
all options unsuccessfully or have been blocked by a defender. A defender may choose
to allow an attack to proceed in order to gain more information. Neither player has
the complete picture as to what the other may or may not do. Petri nets are further
detailed in the chapters that follow.
An example PNP is shown in Figure 1.1. Place are represented by circles and
transitions are represented by rectangles. Place 1, p1, is marked with a token. The
4

Figure 1.1: A Simple Petri Net with Players.

remaining places are not currently marked. Transitions t1 and t2, are stochastically
controlled transitions. Transitions t3, t4, and t5 are all player-controlled. This means
that the controlling player can change the firing rates of the transitions. A single
player is represented in Figure 1.1; however, the formalism allows for any number of
players.
In this research we used a further extension, Petri Nets with Plaerys, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSCs), which resolves certain difficulties with the PNPS formalism
and adds a representation of the costs of the player’s actions. The complete definition
of the PNPSC formalism is given in Chapter 4.
[4] provides a detailed introduction to reinforcement learning. Techniques
from that source were implemented in this work. A supervised learning algorithm

5

Figure 1.2: Reinforcement Learning Framework

is only useful if a training set is available to apply to it. If there is no training set,
then the learning agent must rely on its own experiences. An agent must exploit
what it has already learned from previous actions as well as explore other options to
potentially make a better choice in the future. All agents have explicit goals that they
wish to achieve. Besides having goals, agents have a sense of their environment and
can choose actions to influence this said environment. A key feature of reinforcement
learning algorithms is that they consider the whole problem of an agent interacting
with an uncertain environment.
A reinforcement learning algorithm can be defined by how the agent interacts
with the environment. The learning agent observes the current state of the environment and selects an action. The action is executed producing a new state and a
reward; the latter measures the benefit to the agent that resulted from the action.
This simple process iterates until a problem-specific termination condition is reached.
Figure 1.2 shows the framework as described in [4].
How the Petri net and reinforcement learning algorithm map to each other is
detailed in Chapter 6.
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1.3

Research Questions
The earlier research by Zakrzewska et. al. has provided a strong starting point.

The idea of using the Petri net as a method of modeling a cyberattack lends itself to
further exploration. The algorithm must be able to accurately represent capabilities
of the player. A player would always choose to detect and block an attack; but in
reality, this is limited by technology, experience, and general capability of the player.
The same applies to the attacker. The attacker would always choose to succeed, but
is again limited by their ability and that of the defender. The Petri net with players,
strategies, and costs formalism will include features to represent these limits.
Therefore, I intend to answer the following question with my research:
1. Can the features of a Petri net model be mapped to the framework of a reinforcement learning algorithm?
1.1. Does the reward need to be based on only reaching a player’s success place
or should it be based on reaching an intermediate marking closer to a
successful marking?
2. Can the reinforcement learning algorithm be implemented in a Petri net simulator in order to learn cyberattack and defense strategies?
2.1. Can a reinforcement learning algorithm vary policies to determine the best
policy of an attacker to maximize their reward, i.e., attack a computer
system with a cyberattack?
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2.2. Can a reinforcement learning algorithm vary policies to determine the best
policy of a defender to maximize their reward, i.e., defend a computer
system against a cyberattack?
3. How robust are cyberattack and defense strategies produced by reinforcement
learning?
3.1. In essence, how well do these strategies perform when the adversary’s strategy changes?
4. Can a function be developed to estimate the likely cost of an attacker or defender
changing transitions rates?

1.4

What is Next?
This dissertation is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 is a sample

of literature that was reviewed. This sampling covers cybersecurity with Petri nets,
machine learning in Petri nets, other techniques to model cybersecurity, and other
uses of Petri nets. Parts of this chapter are from [5], [6], and [7].
Chapter 3 is the overview of the complete research project. It details the
components of a standard Petri net and how it works. Also in Chapter 3 is an initial
look at the Zakrzewska PNPS formalism. Portions of this chapter is from [8].
Chapter 4 details the Petri net with players, strategies, and costs formalism
that was developed as part of this research. This formalism was originally published
in [9] and update in [7].
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A structured validation e↵ort of the Petri nets under research was performed
as part of the overall research. The methodology and results of the e↵ort are explained
in Chapter 5 and were published in [10].
A machine learning algorithm was developed to determine the optimal strategy of an attacker and defender. The implementation of the algorithm is given in
Chapter 6 and was submitted for publication in [7]. This chapter also details the
robustness of the algorithm when players compete against each other dynamically.
Chapter 7 details experiments that were conducted. The first experiment
shows how an intrusion detection system can be implemented to improve the defender’s success rate. The second experiment highlights how resource managers can
make decisions based on the generated strategies in order improve success from the
perspective of the attacker.
Finally, in Chapter 8, the results of the previous chapters and conclusions are
given. This chapter answers the research questions in a definitive manner.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Overview
A sample of relevant literature on Petri nets was surveyed for this research1 .

The survey focuses on cybersecurity in Petri nets, machine learning Petri nets, other
techniques to model cybersecurity, and other uses of Petri nets. Based on this literature review, we claimed that using Petri nets as described in [3] to model cybersecurity
and applying machine learning to develop and analyze strategies between adversaries
is novel and an area that requires further research.
In this survey, several authors use variations of spelling of color or colour. The
surveyed authors chosen spelling will be used only for the title of their technique.
Afterwards, the word color will be used instead.

2.2

Cybersecurity in Petri Nets
Over the years, many models have been developed that represent cyberattacks

and their e↵ects on systems. These models vary widely in their intended audience
and functionality. Petri nets are one type of modeling technique. Petri nets have
1

Some material in this chapter is from [5] [7].
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been extended to add functionality and computing power. This section specifically
looks at Petri nets as they have been used in cybersecurity.
The authors in [11] developed stochastic game nets (SGNs) to model a computer network. SGNs are based on stochastic Petri nets (SPNs). SGNs are Petri
nets that are extended with average transition rates for exponentially distributed
transition-firing times. Based on stochastic game theory, the goal of the SGN is to
find a stationary strategy that maximizes rewards for a given player. In order to
determine if a given strategy is the best, the Nash equilibrium is computed. The
Nash equilibrium is a prediction of the stationary state for the network. Zakrzewska
and Ferragut, developers of the PNPS formalism that was the starting point for this
work, assert that while the SGNs are similar to their formalism, PNPS nets di↵er
from SGNs in two ways. In PNPS nets, incomplete information is modeled by limiting the players’ observability of places and utility is measured as a function of Petri
net markings. [3]. An additional shortcoming of SGNs is that they allow the players
to have full knowledge of all available actions, which is potentially unrealistic.
Henry et. al. [12] presents an application of Petri nets to Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. In this work, the authors present a new
notion of risk with regards to cybersecurity. According to the authors, previous
notions of risk were resolved to be estimates of mean time to compromise, or ease of
access from an attacker’s viewpoint. These measures are difficult to evaluate in all
but the most basic of examples.
Instead, Henry et. al. attempt to define a risk measure that is based on
reachable attack states, given initial access conditions. These measures enabled the
11

authors to account for all high-level consequence attack states without regards to
likelihood. This also allowed for a more flexible notion of risk that can be defined as
a computable measure in the attack space [12].
To achieve these measures, Henry et. al. used Petri net coverability analysis.
Using reachability analysis techniques su↵ers from the state space explosion problem
whenever any token/place relationship could grow unbounded. Coverability considers
only whether or not a place was reachable, regardless of the number of tokens. The
standard coverability graph did not solve the problem. Instead, they determined only
if the number of tokens in a place was either zero or greater than zero. This allows
for a simplification because they measure risk as the possibility of accessing a place,
not the likelihood of access [12].
In [13] the authors follow up on their previous work and describe a more formal
approach to coupling computer network attacks to networked system operations. The
networked system exerts control over specific process control systems (PCSs). The
authors present a method for identifying areas of high-value risk mitigation.
Network-based attacks directed against PCSs have created an interest in critical infrastructure protection. The modeling parameters that are typically used to
support probabilistic measures of likelihood are difficult to estimate without credible
data [13]. Henry et. al. instead sought a technique that does not simply rely on measures of likelihood. Specifically, they attempted to determine metrics that indicate
reachable attack states given initial conditions, host configurations in the network,
and known host vulnerabilities. These measures allowed the authors to compute
metrics based on the discrete attack space [13].
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Henry et. al. constructed separate Petri nets for each model element, then
coupled the nets with designed interfaces. This technique allowed the authors to
directly compute system failure state reachability while computing the coverability
set. Using this approach, areas of valuable risk mitigation can be identified. This work
extends the research previous research of [12] by creating a more formal approach [13].
In order to evaluate risk, the authors used computed minimal coverability
sets for a Petri net of the target network. The Petri net was combined with failure
modes derived from the Petri net model of the PCS. Risk was calculated based on the
operational consequences to the specified network. This allows the decision-makers
insight into risk mitigation policy costs versus consequences [13].
Xu et. al. [14] present a method of using extended Petri nets to verify the
presence or absence of threats. The fact that design-level vulnerabilities are a major
source of security risks in software was the motivation for developing a verification
method. Existing methods typically rely on the formalization and verification of
security properties. However, the properties and policies of security goals are often
difficult to define. This is due to the complex nature of software and security [14].
Software applications typically lack sufficient protection because of insufficient
knowledge and understanding of the applications’ particular semantics. Network-level
and operating system-level security measures are unable to keep up with the growing
amount of software that is available. Xu et. al. [14] present a rigorous threat-driven
method for modeling and verification of software. This model uses an extended Petri
net formalism called predicate/transition (PrT) nets. Xu et. al. [14] extended PrT
nets to support aspect-oriented modeling of security issues. Typically, security issues
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cross multiple domains and functional components. The aspect-oriented model provides a flexible mechanism for modeling threats and security measures. The aspectoriented model is able to properly represent intended functions and security threats
as well as mitigations. Therefore, to verify the presence or absence of threats, one
would determine which threats are possible with respect to the PrT model.
Xu et. al. [14] extended PrT nets to support aspect-oriented modeling of security issues. Typically, security issues cross multiple domains and functional components. The aspect-oriented model provides a flexible mechanism for modeling threats
and security measures. The aspect-oriented model is able to properly reflect intended
functions and security threats as well as mitigations. Therefore, to verify the presence
or absence of threats, one would just have to determine what threats are possible with
respect to the PrT model.
This method relies heavily on modeling and verifying very specific behaviors of
security threats. The aspect-oriented methodology allows for incremental verification
of the presence of threats, followed by verification of the removal of threats by mitigations. This method allows for a provably secure computer system from anticipated
attacks as long as the threats are well known and the model is valid with respect to
the computer system. This method also shows that more security can be achieved in
a given situation at the cost of reducing overall system performance [14].
In [15], the authors apply Petri nets to the Smart Grid. Their method is to have
domain experts create smaller, very detailed Petri net models of low level systems and
components. Then an expert takes these small models and applies them to a larger,
more abstract Petri net model of the whole system. In order to combine the Petri
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nets, a model description language was developed to define places and transitions in
a unique manner. This allowed the same places and transitions to be matched. While
this technique is sound for conceptual modeling of a system, the basic Petri net lacks
the power to appropriately model a cyberattack. Additionally, this technique might
lend itself to machine learning. However the authors did not explore that area.
In [16], SCADA attack trees are converted and modeled using an extended
version of SGNs. Cost elements are added to SGNs in order to evaluate the risk of
intrusion. However, SGNs lack the power necessary to model an attack from multiple
perspectives, and they do not model changes to the players’ situational awareness
as they make moves. The case study analyzed does not provide enough detail to
demonstrate that SGNs are ideal for cybersecurity, even with the addition of cost
elements.
In [17] the authors use generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) as part of a
larger framework in order to show the relationship between security and dependability
of control systems. They applied the framework to nuclear power plants, without the
application of machine learning.
In [18], the authors defined object-oriented Petri nets (OPNs) as part of a
larger cyberphysical system (CPS) formal model (CPSFM). OPNs allow the flexibility
to represent encapsulation, inheritance, and other object-oriented characteristics. As
part of a CPSFM, sensors, actuators, and controllers are modeled using OPNs. While
OPNs allow the modeling of a system’s architecture, they do not model opposing
players and concurrent attacks. Instead, they model components of the CPS.
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The authors of [19] describe modeling adversary behavior between attackers
and defenses. They use SPNs to model a CPS with intrusion detection systems, data
leak controls, and redundant devices. The model looks at the system from an abstract
level of sensors, actuators, communication, management, and distributed controller
nodes. The model lacks dynamic capabilities to represents changing behaviors. Additionally, transitions are not controlled by players and optimal strategies are not
identified.
[20] models cyberplatforms using SPNs. The authors’ method used nodes to
represent three di↵erent states: idle, operations, and deceptive. Multiple nodes are
connected together to represent a cyberplatform. The transitions in the model are
all stochastic and cannot be controlled by a player. Attacks are not modeled and
strategies are not developed.
In [21], the authors describe using Petri nets and attack trees to model softwaredefined networks (SDNs). They divide the networks into three parts representing user
access, data transmission, and the controller. The parts are modeled by Petri nets
and attack trees to represent the network and system states. The model does not
represent player strategies and does not have the computing power of extended Petri
nets.
In [22], the author models a computer system using stochastic activity networks (SANs). The model allows the computation of quantitative characteristics,
such as reliability, availability, and maintainability. The model utilizes basic attack
forms, such as denial of services and escalation of privileges. However, the model
represents only the fact that an attack is ongoing and does not model a dynamic
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adversary. Additionally, the model does not apply machine learning strategies or
represent situational awareness between adversaries.
In [23], the authors model malware behavior using colored Petri nets (CPNs).
This model allows for behavioral analysis to be performed, thereby enabling identification of foreign or suspicious activities. While this technique was powerful, it did
not allow for the modeling of strategies, nor did it model adversarial relationships.
In [24], the authors use timed Petri nets to model impact and timing of attacks, vulnerabilities, and recovery of nodes. A second Petri net is used to model
cybersituational awareness. This use of situational awareness refers to the marking
of the places of the Petri net and not how much knowledge the attacker or defender
have of each other. The attacks that are modeled are high level and do not represent
specific attacks, just that the system has been compromised. This model does not
use machine learning or attempt to determine strategies.
The Petri net methods described in this previous section lack the ability to
model cyberattacks and the situational awareness between adversaries. [3] presents the
only viable technique to model attacker and defender behaviors, while also modeling
the ability to gain knowledge of adversaries and their moves over time.

2.3

Machine Learning Peri Nets
This author attempted to find published works that applied machine learning

to Petri net models of cybersecurity, but was unable to find anything relevant. Therefore, in this section, papers describing applications of machine learning to Petri nets
in other areas are detailed.
17

Several authors demonstrated learning Petri nets in the field of genetics. M.
Mayo presented in [25] a method of creating Petri nets using a simple random hill
climb machine learning technique. The author used the hill climbing technique to
solve for optimal arc weights and connectivity between places and transitions. This
modeled biochemical gene interactions. The work described in [26] follows the work
in [25]. The authors use the Petri net property of coverability in order to identify
markings that are unique in the model. These represent unique genetic markings.
Similarly, the authors in [27] applied machine learning techniques to Fuzzy Coloured
Petri Nets, or FCPNs. Their method relied on genetic algorithms for their learning
technique to improve the fuzzy production rules of the nets.
The authors in [28] applied fuzzy Petri nets (FPNs) to pattern recognition and
classification. Additionally, fuzzy dates were added to both transitions and tokens in
order to model timing. The authors used a supervised machine learning technique
in order to dynamically update the FPN. The state of the FPN evolves according
to fuzzy transitions and fuzzy markings, allowing dynamic learning to occur. This
allows time to be explicitly accounted for.
In [29], the authors used adaptive fuzzy coloured Petri nets (AFCPNs) to
model traffic signals. The model utilized a type of reinforcement learning, learning
automata, to determine the ideal delay time in the traffic signal. Based on previous
states and reactions, the AFCPN will predict the next optimum solution, including
updating the center of membership functions to achieve the best timing. The model
does not represent adversaries and is not applied to cybersecurity.
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The authors of [30] used disassembly Petri nets (DPN) with hybrid Bayesian
networks (HBN) to model the disassembly process for environmental waste. The
HBN was derived from the DPN. They then applied statistical inference to the HBN
to optimize their solution. After initializing the inference parameters, the combined
DPN-HBN model was updated as the simulation proceeded with evidence. They
did not model cybersecurity or apply reinforcement learning to solve for optimal
strategies.
[31] describes using stochastic time colored Petri nets in order to model faults
in a system. They use a supervised machine learning technique to learn the normal
state of the system and then execute the model until a fault is detected. Once
detected, the machine learning method is updated with the new condition in order
to recognize it in the future. This change to the net includes placing tokens in the
fault transition, modifying transition arcs, and adding specific fault tokens to the
initial marking. While this model does use machine learning, it relies on learning the
nominal operation first.
In [32], the authors propose a method of applying reinforcement learning to
a high level timed Petri net. The transition delays times are learned in order to
optimize the model. The authors used an RFID guide dog to experimentally validate
their model. The model used two di↵erent reinforcement learning techniques to solve
for continuous delay time, the discretization method and the function approximation
method. While this technique has a solid foundation for modeling reinforcement
learning, it was not applied to cybersecurity and does not model adversaries.
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In [33], the author describes a method of applying reinforcement learning to
high-level fuzzy petri nets (HLFPNs). In order to apply machine learning, HLFPNs are extended as the Reinforcement Petri-Net-based Fuzzy Logic Control System
(RPN-FLCS). This extension uses two independent components, a fuzzy controller
and a fuzzy predictor. These components use the temporal di↵erence method in order to predict the outcomes of the reinforcement signal. The use of two separate
Petri nets expands the complexity of the simulation, thereby introducing the greater
chances of errors in the model. Additionally, HLFPNs do not provide the parameters
necessary to model a computer system accurately.
Petri nets were not used in the machine learning technique described in [34].
However, the authors use a form of machine learning know as multi-agent reinforcement learning. They apply this along with Q-learning in order to optimize web service
composition. This technique is worth further exploration in developing strategies for
cyberattacks and cyberdefense.

2.4

Other Techniques to Model Cybersecurity
For completeness, it is worth exploring techniques other than Petri nets to

model cybersecurity. This section describes various options of describing cyberattacks.
In [35] the authors propose a discrete event simulation framework to combine
cybersecurity and physical security systems. This integration allows for evaluation of
impacts from either system upon the other. While this technique does model attacks,
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they are limited to breach, evaluate progress, and degrade safeguards. Attacker and
defender strategies are not developed or analyzed.
To support the chemical industry, in [36] the authors propose a framework
to design cyberphysical systems. Y. Khalil takes a similar approach to the chemical
industry by presenting a probabilistically timed dynamic model using visual flowcharting. This flowcharting allows the representation of physical security attacks. However,
the author admits that this model does not implement interactions between attackers and defenders [37]. Additionally, neither technique models cyberattacks in their
current implementation.
[38] uses formal modeling techniques to discover cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
They apply the technique by modeling the system as a finite state machine. To
support resiliency, the authors define alternative states to prevent a system failure.
This method does not model dynamic adversaries, nor does it provide strategies for
either attacker or defender.
In [39], the authors present a technique to define attacks from the point of view
of the attackers called ARTT Taxonomy. This defines an attack by four elements:
Attack vector, Result, Type, and Target. Then they use system entity structures to
describe a cyberattack as a hierarchical model. Their technique does not describe
interactions between attackers and defenders. It also does not model strategies or
situational awareness. It also lacks the power of Petri nets to describe multiple ongoing
attacks.
In [40], the authors develop a game theory approach to solve cyberattacks. The
game that they develop models multiple attackers competing for a pool of computing
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resources. The competitor with the most compromised computers at the end of
the game is the winner. Tree searches are used to determine next moves for each
competitor. While game theory is used, the strategies are predefined and are not
improved after each game completion. Additionally, the game does not model specific
individual attacks.
In [41], the authors describe a tool called CyberSim that models cyberattacks
from a top-down modular approach. This approach allows designers with various levels of expertise to model attacks on enterprise networks. However, in their description
of the tool, they do not describe how defenders are modeled, if at all. They also do
not model strategies for attackers and defenders, nor do they optimize the strategies.
The authors of [42] present a model to represent the cost of security versus the
risk of compromise to identified stakeholders. The Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) uses multiple matrices to model stakeholders, dependency, and
impact. The model employs a Bayesian belief network to capture complex variables
and their relationships.
In [43], the authors present a workflow model of a Cyber Security Incident
Response Team’s (CSIRT) actions. The perceived level of threat is modeled in the
workflow based on the expertise of the analyst, the novelty of the activity, and how
recent a similar event has occurred. While the model does an adequate job of representing how an activity is characterized and resolved, it does not incorporate adversaries. The interactions between an attacker and defender are not identified and
strategies are not developed between the opposing players.
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Colbaugh and Glass [44] attempt to apply machine learning and game theory
to Spam filters. They used a supervised machine learning algorithm to develop their
defense system. Colbaugh used a large public database of emails with Spam and
known good emails alike. The authors applied their algorithm against a well-tuned
naive Bayes (NB) Spam filter to determine if their machine learning algorithm was
successful or not. Their results indicated that both filters started o↵ successfully
filtering approximately 95% the emails. However, after 4 years, the NB algorithm
success rate deteriorated to 75% while the machine learning algorithm remained above
90%.
The works presented here have their advantages and disadvantages. None of
the works studied have been applied to model the strategies or interactions between
attacker and defender. Additionally, the situational awareness between the adversaries is not modeled or well established.

2.5

Other Uses of Petri Nets
To complete the survey, other uses of Petri nets were briefly sampled. These

uses apply to areas other than cybersecurity and use modeling techniques other than
machine learning. The techniques described in this section were chosen because they
detail replacing traditional diagrams with Petri nets. This usage of Petri nets helps
to further emphasize the versatility of modeling with Petri nets.
In [45], the authors describe a technique of using Petri nets to model workflows.
Petri nets naturally allow for places and transitions to replace the typical bubbles and
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arrows of a workflow diagram. Using the token-game semantics of a Petri net allows
for errors in a workflow model to be identified before the model is implemented.
In order to properly model the workflow engine, Eshuis et. al. [45] describe a
reactive net, which is an extended Petri net. This reactive net allows for the proper
modeling of ECA rules. There are two types of transitions in a reactive net, some
that are allowed to fire immediately after enabling the transition and some that may
fire at any time after the transition is enabled. Additionally, a transition priority is
used to prevent conflicts of internal transitions versus external transitions as defined
in [45].
[46] applied Petri nets to computer supported cooperative work systems in
order to model behavior of team interactions. They derived Petri nets to capture
actual human behavior with regards to communication protocols. J. Vidal et. al.
describe in [47] high level Petri nets in order to model units of learning in education.
Units of learning are treated as a learning workflow with activities being carried out
by participants. The model is verified by selecting properties appropriate for workflows, specifically safeness, reachability, deadlock, and liveness. Similarly, a technique
described in [48] utilizes colored Petri nets to implement a Belief-Desire-Intention
structure to model learning activities. In [49], the authors extend the previous research of [47] to include changing Petri nets. This allowed the model to replace one
net with another while the simulation is running to update the unit of learning.
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2.6

Summary
The previous sections summarize the current state of the art for modeling

cybersecurity with Petri nets. As can be seen, none of the works discussed model
situational awareness between adversaries as was presented in [3]. Additionally, none
of the works studied use machine learning techniques to learn strategies between
adversaries. To be able to solve this problem and analyze cyberattack and defense
strategies, the Petri nets described in [3] should be used and extended appropriately.
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CHAPTER 3

MODELING CYBERATTACKS WITH PETRI NETS: RESEARCH
PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT

3.1

Introduction and Motivation
Cybersecurity has become an urgent concern1 . Modern society is increasingly

reliant on computer systems for nearly all aspects of life. There are many threats to
those computer systems and the data they contain, including privacy invasion, financial theft, infrastructure sabotage, and election tampering. Motivated by the growing
importance of cybersecurity issues, cybersecurity modeling is an active research area,
with a wide range of applications and methods. Examples cybersecurity modeling
projects include:
• Evaluating distributed denial-of-service detection processes using open-source
network simulation software [50]
• Modeling attacks on computer networks using distributed simulation [51]
• Modeling malware propagation using agent-based modeling [52]
1

Some material in this chapter is from [8].
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• Modeling Global Positioning System-related attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles using an open-source UAV simulation test bed [53]
• Modeling cybersecurity risk using game theory [54]
The University of Alabama in Huntsville is conducting four interrelated research projects that together form an integrated research program in cyberattack
modeling. All four projects are using an extension of Petri nets, knows as Petri nets
with Players and Strategies, as the basic modeling formalism. In this paper we give
an overview of and status report of those projects. Section 3.2 provides explanatory background on cyberattack modeling, Petri nets, and the extension of Petri nets
specialized for cyberattack modeling that the projects are using. Finally, Section
3.3 describes the research program, including the four component projects and the
program’s overall goals.

3.2

Background
This section provides explanatory background on cyberattack modeling, Petri

nets, and the extension of Petri nets specialized for cyberattack modeling that the
projects are using.

3.2.1

Petri Nets
Petri nets are an abstract formal modeling language or notation [1] [55] [56].

Petri nets are able to model distributed, discrete, and dynamic systems. The semantics of Petri nets are oriented towards modeling sequence, concurrency, and synchro-
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Figure 3.1: A Simple Petri Net.

nization in processes, networks, and workflows. The Petri nets formalism has proven
to be highly flexible and extensible, and many applications and extensions exist.
In their standard and simplest form, Petri nets consist essentially of places and
transitions, connected by arcs; the places may contain tokens. See Figure 3.1 for an
example of a small Petri net. (In the figure, the labels and dashed arrows in blue are
not part of the Petri net, they are explanatory annotations.) Places are represented
graphically by circles, transitions by bars or rectangles, arcs by arrows, and tokens
by dots. Places and transitions may be given names, either abstract names such as
the p1, p2, p3 (places) and t1 (transition) shown in Figure 3.1, or descriptive names
that describe what the place or transition is modeling.
A place represents a state or condition in the system or process being modeled
by the Petri net. If a place contains a token, that state or condition is interpreted
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as true. The presence or absence of tokens in the places of a Petri net is referred to
as the Petri net’s marking. A Petri net’s marking when its execution begins is its
initial marking. A transition represents an action or event that may change the state
or condition of the system. Transitions may have one or more input places, denoted
by arcs directed from the place(s) to the transition, and one or more output places,
denoted by arcs directed from the transition to the place(s). The number of input and
output places of a transition need not be the same. If all of a transition’s input places
contain a token, that transition is said to be enabled. Enabled transitions may fire,
which is interpreted as the action represented by the transition occurring. When a
transition fires, a token is removed from each of its input places and a token is added
to each of its output places. That change in the Petri net’s marking is interpreted as
a change in the state of the system or process the Petri net is modeling as a result
of the action represented by the firing transition occurring. A standard Petri net’s
execution logic, expressed as pseudocode, is summarized in Figure 3.2.
Determine which transitions are enabled
while at least one transition enabled do
Arbitrarily select one of the enabled transitions
Fire the selected transition, changing Petri net’s marking
Determine which transitions are enabled
end
Figure 3.2: Execution Logic of a Standard Petri Net.

Figure 3.3 shows three slightly more complicated Petri nets, drawn from an
office furniture manufacturing application. Figure 3.3(a) represents synchronization.
Both of the transition’s input places (Drawer available and Handle available) must
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be marked, i.e., true, before the transition’s action (Attach handle) can be performed
to complete the drawer. Figure 3.3(b) represents resource constraints. A conveyor is
required for the transport action to occur. Two conveyors are available, represented
by the two tokens in the Conveyor available place. After a conveyor is used for transport, represented by the Transport transition, it must be reset by the Reset Conveyor
transition before it can be used for another transport. Figure 3.3(c) combines concurrency resource constraints. The left and right processes, which are the movement
of materials in the factory, can occur largely in parallel, but when they arrive at the
same crossing point in the factory, only one can process through the crossing at a
time. The single crossing is represented by the single token in the Crossing open
place, with the e↵ect that the Cross A and Cross B transitions must fire serially.
One of the advantages of Petri nets is that their semantics, described informally
above, can be expressed formally and unambiguously. A standard Petri net is formally
defined as a 5-tuple P N = (S, T, W, M0 , B), where
• S = p1 , p2 , . . .; finite, non-empty set of places
• T = t1 , t2 , . . .; finite, non-empty set of transitions
• W ✓ (S ⇥ T ) [ (T ⇥ S); set of arcs from places to transitions and transitions
to places
• B : S ! Z+ [ 1; upper bound on tokens per place
• M0 : S ! Z+ ; initial marking of tokens in places, with 0  M0 (p)  B(p) for
every p 2 S
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S and B together imply a “space” (set) M ⇤ of all possible markings; M0 2 M ⇤ . M
or Mi , where i is a time step or firing step, denotes the current marking or the time
at time or firing step i.

(b)

(a)

(c)

Figure 3.3: Three Example Petri Nets That Model Manufacturing Processes.

3.2.2

Petri Nets with Players and Strategies
A substantial extension of Petri nets, specifically proposed for modeling cy-

berattack vulnerabilities and the execution of attacks exploiting those vulnerabilities,
is described in [3]. The formalism, referred to as Petri Nets with Players and Strate31

gies (PNPS), extends standard Petri nets in several ways. Three are of particular
relevance to cyberattack modeling.
Firing rates. In a standard Petri net, the transition to fire is selected arbitrarily
from among all enabled transitions. In a PNPS net, each transition has an associated
firing rate. The rate is interpreted as the number of times the transition will fire, on
average, per time unit, or more generally, as the likelihood that the action or event
the transition is modeling will occur. Higher rates result in increased likelihood of
occurring. During each execution cycle, a firing time is generated for each enabled
transition as an exponentially distributed random variate, using each transition’s rate
as the exponential distribution’s rate parameter

(see [57] for details of how to do

this). Then the enabled transition with the earliest firing time is selected for firing.
Players, player goals, and player-observable places. Two (or more) competing
(or cooperating) players are defined. The players have goals, defined as markings in
the PNPS net that they wish to achieve. They attempt to influence the sequence
of firings, and thus ultimately the markings reached, in the PNPS net in order to
achieve their goals. Players do not have complete information during the execution
of the PNPS net. Only a subset of the PNPS net’s places is observable by each player
during execution. Each player must determine what actions to take based on their
player-observable places. This feature models the limited information an attacker
or defender might have regarding the state of the target computer system and the
adversary’s actions during a cyberattack.
Player-controlled transitions. Players attempt to influence the sequence of firings in the PNPS net in order to reach a marking consistent with their goal. They
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do so by changing the firing rates associated with each transition. However, players
may not change the rates of any transition in the PNPS net. Rather, each player
has a defined set of player-controlled transitions. The transitions controlled by a
player represent those actions an attacker or defender may take during a cyberattack. A player may only change the rates associated with the transitions that playercontrols. During execution, each player observes the PNPS net’s marking in that
player’s player-observable places and may change the rates of that player’s playercontrolled transitions.
PNPS nets are formally defined as an 8-tuple P N P S = (P N, P, ⇥, O, R, F, ⌦, ),
where
• P N ; standard Petri net, as defined earlier
• P ; finite, non-empty set of players
• ⇥; partition of transition set T into non-controlled and player-controlled transitions
• O; partition of place set S into places observable by each player
• R; mapping from observations to utility
• F ; firing rates for non-player-controlled transitions
• ⌦; max firing rates for player-controlled transitions
•

; mapping from observable markings to firing rates for player-controlled transitions
33

PNPS component

represents each player’s strategy. It maps PNPS net markings

in a player’s observable places to rates in a player’s controllable transitions. In each
execution cycle,

determines how each player will change the rates of the transitions

that player-controls in order to achieve that player’s goals.
The execution logic of a PNPS net, expressed as pseudocode, is shown in
Figure 3.4. The boolean variable reset controls an aspect of the PNPS net execution
left unspecified in [3]; whether or not an enabled transition’s firing time is retained
or reset if it is not the transition selected for firing. The pseudocode in Figure 3.4 is
written to handle either interpretation. In Figure 3.4, reset is set to TRUE, causing
the firing times to be reset; setting reset to FALSE in the pseudocode would have
the opposite e↵ect. Variables prevenabled and curenabled are vectors of boolean
variables, with one element for each transition. Individual elements in the vectors are
referenced using subscripts; references to the vectors without a subscript indicated
setting the entire vector. The symbol # precedes comments in the pseudocode.
Figure 3.5 is an example of a PNPS net from [3]. In the figure, the places and
transitions are labeled with the cyberattack condition or action respectively that they
represent. Each transition also has a firing rate indicated. The transitions with green
borders are non-controlled transitions, whereas the transitions with blue borders are
attacker controlled.

3.3

Research Program Projects and Structure
This section describes the research program, including the four component

projects and the program’s overall goals.
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reset
TRUE
t
0
#t is current time, initially 0
prevenabled
FALSE
enabled
enabled status of all transitions based on current marking M
while at least one transition enabled do
foreach transition i do
if enabledi and (reset or not prevenabledi ) then
fi
exp( i )
#Interfiring time for enabled
#transition i
fi
t + fi
#Firing time for enabled transition i
end
end
j
enabled transition with earliest (smallest) fi
t
fi
#Advance time to firing time
#of firing transition
fire transition j, change marking M
enabledi
FALSE
#Disable just-fired transition
prevenabled
enabled
#Save enabled status of
#all transitions
enabled
enabled status of all transitions
based on current marking M
foreach player p do
change rates of player-controlled transitions Tp per strategy p
end
end
Figure 3.4: Execution Logic of a PNPS Net.

3.3.1

Generating Cyberattack Component Models
In the first of the four integrated research projects, known computer system

vulnerabilities stored in a standard vulnerability database (CAPEC) are converted
(semi-automatically) into Attack Trees, one per vulnerability. Attack Trees are similar to Extended Fault Trees, as used in systems engineering, but are instead applied
to cybersecurity. The Attack Trees specify the vulnerability in a logical and unambiguous way. This conversion is semi-automatic because there may be missing or
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Figure 3.5: Generating Cyberattack Component Models.

contradictory information in the vulnerability database that must be manually resolved. Then the Attack Trees are converted (automatically) into PNPS nets (as
defined earlier and in [3]), one per vulnerability, of an attack exploiting that vulnerability.
The resulting PNPS nets are considered model components, rather than a complete model, because individually they model only one vulnerability. Most computer
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Figure 3.6: Generating Cyberattack Component Models.

systems to be modeled will have multiple vulnerabilities and will require multiple
model components to represent them completely.
This project is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Additional information on this project
can be found in the companion papers [58] and [59].

3.3.2

Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Models
In the second of the four integrated research projects, cyberattack compo-

nent models are stored in a repository containing many such components. Those
component models tagged with meta-data describing their function and interfaces.
That metadata is used to guide the automatic selection and composition a set of the
component models from the repository so as to model a particular target computer
system. This project is illustrated in Figure 3.7(left).

3.3.3

Validating Cyberattack Models
In the third of the four integrated research projects, the assembled composite

model of the target computer system is validated as an accurate model of the target
system by comparing the model and target system using multiple suitable validation
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Figure 3.7: Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Models (left) and Validating
Cyberattack Models (right).

methodologies [60]. The validation may be based on the formal properties of Petri
nets and manual testing of attack sequences represented in the Petri net model. This
project is illustrated in Figure 3.7(right). Additional information on this project can
be found in [61] and the companion paper [5].

3.3.4

Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies
In the fourth of the four integrated research projects, which is the subject of

this dissertation, the validated model is executed to simulate cyberattacks on the
target computer system. Multiple simulation iterations of a simulated attack are executed to drive a machine learning algorithm that uses reinforcement learning methods [4] to automatically learn and improve strategies to attack or defend the target
computer system. The algorithm’s learning goals are to improve the likelihood of successful attack or defense and to identify and assess the target system’s vulnerability
to attack. This project is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies.
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CHAPTER 4

AN EXTENDED PETRI NET FORMALISM FOR MODELING
CYBERATTACKS

4.1

Introduction and Motivation
In today’s day and age, one of the most significant threats to organizations and

government agencies are results of a cyberattack1 . The knowledge of cyberattacks has
been recognized to be instrumental in the design of secure software [62]. Research
studies have documented that cyberattacks follow a specific pattern based on what
an attacker is attempting to accomplish. By following the pattern of cyberattacks,
models can be created to be analyzed and determine the impact of these attacks. By
studying these models, developers are able to gain knowledge to prevent these attacks
from occurring and to learn how an attacker would usually proceed.
The modeling of cyberattacks has been the focus of several studies. He and
Zhu focus on P2P networks and Grid computing. They propose a Negotiation Petri
net (SNPN) that models policies that take place between strangers through the exchange of digital credentials [63]. Yuan et. al work with patterns that are relevant
to STRIDE (Microsoft’s SDL, Security Development Lifecycle tool). They developed
1

Some material in this chapter is from [9].
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a tool that retrieves attack patterns from the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC) based on its relevance to STRIDE [64]. A study that is
similar to Yuan et. al, except that the focus is on the system itself, was conducted
by Pauli and Egebretson. They developed a prototype tool that provides system prerequisites and mitigation strategies based on the automated population of CAPEC
attack pattern hierarchies [65].
One important concept in understanding and analyzing cyberattacks is to be
able to view the attack patterns from an attacker’s perspective. Barnum and Sethi
discuss this as being the foundation for understanding the process that an attacker
goes through in an attempt to exploit a system [62]. By understanding the actions of
an attacker, the development of a defense mechanism is the next logical step. Pan et.
al describes a methodology to develop a model based defense focused on an electric
transmissions system [66].
Cho and Ben-Asher performed a study on the modeling and analysis of integrated defense systems [67]. Their study claims three key contributions, to be the first
to investigate the performance of a system with the use of three combined defense
techniques from both the defender and attacker point of view, to develop a Stochastic
Petri Net (SPN) that they use to evaluate the performance and develop metrics to
be applied, and to simulate four variants created from the defense techniques known
as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), IDS with deception, IDS with Moving Target
Defense (MTD), and IDS with both deception and MTD to provide a comprehensive
comparison on performance analysis. To fully understand the study, the authors first
introduce the concepts of reconnaissance defense, intrusion detection, and intrusion
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prevention. Cho and Ben-Asher do not go into details or provide any formalism as
to how their stochastic petri nets are composed. Their focus is also not on modeling
attacks themselves, but they take a general view of an attacker gaining access to
a network by going through several states or attack phases such as reconnaissance,
defense by deception, the attacker failing due to the deception, the attacker detecting
deception, the defender using MTD’s and IDS’s in addition to Honeypots to cause
deception, and of course the chance that the attacker is successful.
Other areas of modeling cybersecurity include studies in attacks on computer
networks, malware propagation using agent-based modeling, and game theory. Zakrzewska and Ferragut have extended the design of a Petri net to support gametheoretic analysis of cyberattacks [3]. Petty et. al have established a four phase
project which expands in the formalism described by Zakrzewska and Ferragut, and
also covers selection and composition of cyberattack models, validation of those models, and machine learning that can take place by the defense strategies [8].
The analysis and planning of a defense mechanism are essential sources of
information to build secure systems. Both can be obtained by modeling attack behaviors and consequences. This study focuses on expanding Petri Nets with Players
and Strategies to model di↵erent cyberattacks. An overview of modeling attacks with
Petri Nets and Petri Nets with Players and Strategies is provided in the next section.
Extensions to PNPS are introduced with formal definitions in Section 3, followed by
an example of application and a summary of this study.
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4.2

Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs
This section details the extension to the original Zakrzewska formalism as was

presented in Chapter 3.

4.2.1

Description and Definition
The PNPSC formalism used in this work and described later in this section

is an extension of Petri nets, which were introduced in [1], so we first briefly review
Petri nets. Conceptually, Petri nets consist of places, transitions, and arcs. Places
may contain zero or more tokens. The numbers of tokens in each place of a Petri
net at a given time is that net’s marking. In a Petri net model of a system, places
represent states that are true or false (containing a token or not, respectively) or
integer quantities (containing zero or more tokens). Transitions represent actions or
events that could change the state of the modeled system. Arcs either connect places
to transitions (input arcs) or transitions to places (output arcs). When all of the places
that are connected to a transition by input arcs contain a token, that transition is said
to be enabled. Enabled transitions may fire, which models the occurrence of the action
or event that the transition represents. If multiple transitions are simultaneously
enabled, one of them is chosen arbitrarily to fire. When a transition fires, tokens
are removed from each of that transition’s input places and added to each of that
transition’s output places. This change in the Petri net’s marking represents a change
in the state of the system that the Petri net models.
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Places are typically represented graphically by circles, transitions by bars or
rectangles, arcs by arrows, and tokens by dots. Places and transitions may be given
names, either abstract names or descriptive names that describe what the place or
transition is modeling.
Following [2] and [56], a standard Petri net PN can be formally defined as a
6-tuple P N = (P, T, W, M0 , B, L), where:
1. P = {p1 , p2 , . . .}; finite, non-empty set of places,
2. T = {t1 , t2 , . . .}; finite, non-empty set of transitions,
3. W ✓ (P ⇥ T ) [ (T ⇥ P ); set of directed arcs from places to transitions and
transitions to places
4. B : P ! Z+ [ 1; upper bound on tokens per place
5. M0 : P ! Z+ ; initial marking of tokens in places with 0  M0 (p)  B(p) for
every p 2 P
6. L = W ! Z+ [ { 1}; arc weights
A place p 2 P may contain 0 to B(p) tokens. A Petri net’s current overall
marking is denoted by M or Mi , where i is a time step or firing step, and the current
marking of a subset O ✓ P of the places denoted MO . A set M ⇤ of all possible
markings is implied by P and B, where Mi 2 M ⇤ for i = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Arc set W can be
partitioned into two disjoint subsets W1 ✓ (P ⇥ T ) and W2 ✓ (T ⇥ P ); W = W1 [ W2
and W1 \ W2 = ?. Arcs in W1 , i.e., from places to transitions, are input arcs, whereas
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arcs in W2 , i.e., from transitions to places, are output arcs. The arc weight L(w) for
input arc w = (p, t) 2 W1 is the minimum number of tokens that must be present
in place pfor transition t to be enabled and that will be removed from p when t
fires. The arc weight L(w) for output arc w = (t, p) 2 W2 is the number of tokens
to be placed in p when t fires. If an input arc w = (p, t) has arc weight L(w) =

1,

transition t is disabled, i.e., it may not fire, whenever place p is marked, i.e., contains
at least one token. An arc w with L(w) =

1 is called an inhibitor arc. L(w) =

1 is

undefined and should not occur for an output arc w = (t, p) 2 W2 . Some definitions
of standard Petri nets omit the arc weights function L. In Petri nets defined without
explicit arc weights, the implicit arc weight L(w) = 1 for all w 2 W .
For more detailed explanations of Petri net notation and semantics, see [2]
or [56].
The Petri net with players, strategies, and costs (PNPSC) formalism used
in this work is an extension of Petri nets. Zakrezewska and Ferragut previously
extended Petri nets for modeling cyberattacks with a representation of competing
players and their strategies to define Petri nets with players and strategies (PNPS) [3].
The PNPSC formalism defined here resolves some ambiguities in the original PNPS
definition and further extends it with a notion of costs; the latter is intended to
represent the cost, in terms of expense or e↵ort, to attack or defend a computer
system in a cyberattack [9].
In a PNPSC net, each transition has an associated rate which is interpreted
as the rate parameter

of an exponential distribution representing the transition’s

stochastic inter-firing time. When multiple transitions are simultaneously enabled,
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an exponentially distributed random variate is generated for each enabled transition
using the transition’s rate; then the transition with the smallest random variate, i.e.,
the smallest inter-firing time, is fired. PNPSC nets also include a set of players, each
of whom may observe the markings of a portion of the net’s places. Based on the
observed marking, and thus the state of the modeled system the marking represents,
each player may act by changing (either increasing or decreasing, within limits) the
rates of the subset of the transitions that that player controls. Changing transitions’
rates either increases or decreases the likelihood of those transitions firing. In that
way the players seek to bring the marking of the PNPSC net, i.e., the state of the
modeled system, to be consistent with their goals. The firing of a transition can
represent a state change caused by an action taken by one, or sometimes more than
one, player, and so each transition firing may have a cost to one or more players.
Players attempt to achieve their goal markings while simultaneously minimizing their
total cost incurred.
A PNPSC is 14-tuple formally defined as P N P SC = (P, T, W, M0 , B,
L, G, ⇥, O, F, ⌦, , C, D), where
1. P, T, W, M0 , B, L; as defined earlier for a standard Petri net
2. G = g1 , g2 , . . .; finite, non-empty set of players
3. ⇥ = (T0 , T1 , T2 , . . . , T|G| ); partition of transition set T into |G| + 1 subsets such
that T0 [ T1 [ T2 [ . . . [ T|G| and Tj \ Tk = ? for 0  j, k  |G| and j 6= k;
Ti = set of transitions controlled by player gi for 1  i  |G| and T0 = set of
stochastic transitions not controlled by any player
46

4. O = (O1 , O2 , . . . , O| G|); collection of |G| subsets of place set P, i.e, Oi ✓ P for
1  i  |O|; Oi is the subset of place set P observable by player gi
5. F : T ! R+ ; firing rates for transitions, both non-player-controlled and playercontrolled; the latter may be changed during execution
6. ⌦ : (T

T0 ) ! R+ ; maximum firing rates for player-controlled transitions;

0 < F (t)  ⌦(t) for t 2 (T
7.

:(

1,

2, . . . ,

|G| ;

T0 )

collection of functions

i

⇤
: MOi
! R+|Ti | where each

i

is

a mapping from the possible markings of player gi ’s observable places to the
desired firing rates for each of player gi ’s controlled transitions
8. C = (C1 , C2 ); collection of two functions representing costs; C1 : T ! R+ and
C2 : (Ti , F0 , F1 ) ! R+
9. D : T ! }(G); players that incur a cost for a fired transition
⇥ is a partition of transition set T, which implies that no transition may be
controlled by more than one player (and some transitions may not be controlled by any
player). On the other hand, O is not necessarily a partition of place set P, thus places
may be observed by 0, 1, or more than 1 player.

represents the players’ strategies.

Given a marking M, each player gi may observe the marking MOi of a subset Oi of
the net’s places. Based on that observed marking, player gi will want to set the firing
rates of that player’s player-controlled transitions Ti to certain values. Function

i

is

thus a mapping from all possible markings of player gi ’s observable places, denoted
⇤
MOi
, to the desired rates for player gi ’s controlled transitions.
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i

returns those desired

rates as a vector with |Ti | elements. C represents the costs, i.e., the expense or e↵ort,
of the players’ actions to the players during a cyberattack. It has two component
functions, representing di↵erent aspects of the total costs. C1 is the transition firing
cost; it specifies the cost of the action or event that a transition represents. C2 is the
rate change cost; it specifies the cost to perform the action required to change a set
of transitions’ rates. C2 is defined as C2 =

P

j2Ti

|F0 (j)

F1 (j)|. Recall that Ti is the

set of transitions controlled by player pi . Using subscripts 0 and 1 to denote “before”
and “after” respectively, F0 (j) is the rate of transition tj before a rate change and
F1 (j) is the same transition’s rate after a rate change. Thus C2 is the sum of the
absolute values of the changes to the rates of the transitions controlled by player pi .
D is the set of players that incur the cost of firing a transition; that set may consist
of 0, 1, or more than one player.

4.2.2

Transition Firing Time Resetting
An important part of the PNPSC modeling is the determination of the time

when a transition is to be fired and the overall state of the system after the firing.
One approach is based on the observable places as defined previously. With the
ability to inspect the observable places, the transition to be fired can be determined
based on the cost associated to keeping tokens within an observable place or having
it pass through to the next part of the net. The recalculation of all firing times for all
enabled transitions is another approach. Due to this recalculation, this implies that
an enabled transition that would have been scheduled to fire next now could become
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the last. This section provides details as to how the time when a transition is to be
fired is determined within PNPSC.

4.2.3

Transition Firing Rates and Probabilities
At any given time during the execution of a PNPSC net, some subset (not nec-

essarily proper) of the net’s transitions will be enabled. The firing time of an enabled
transition is a function of its current rate; in particular, a transition’s firing time is a
random variate generated from an exponential distribution, with the transition’s rate
the exponential distribution’s rate.
In order to simulate the firing of transitions, it is necessary to determine the
probability that a specific enabled transition will be the next to fire given that a set of
transitions are enabled at given time, or equivalently, the probability that a specific
enabled transition has the earliest firing time.
Understanding the relationship between a transition’s rate and its probability
of firing next may influence a player’s strategy as encoded in the strategy function
in terms of the rate to which a player-controlled transition will be set. (As an aside,
this raises the question of whether or not the rates of transitions not controlled by a
player should be observable by the player, because a player may wish to set the rate
of a controlled transition so that it is likely to fire before, or after, a non-controlled
transition. This topic, however, will be addressed separately.)
Based on initial studies by Sheffield, Takahara, and Did and merging and
clarifying of their similar derivations, this study proposes a new solution on Theorem
4.1 [68], [69], and [70].
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Theorem 4.1. Assume that at a specific time n, transitions t1 , t2 , . . . , tn are enabled,
and their rates are currently

1,

2, . . . ,

n,

with firing times, which are random vari-

ates generated from exponential distributions with those rates, X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn . Let
=

1

+

2

+ ... +

n,

i.e., the sum of the enabled transitions’ rates. The proba-

bility that a specific transition ti with 1  i  n, will fire next, or equivalently, that
Xi = min(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) is the ratio
t1 , t2 , . . . , tn with rates
next is

i/

1,

2, . . . ,

n

i/

, or given a set of enabled transitions

in a PNPSC, then the probability that ti will fire

.

Proof. Note that Xi = min(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) if and only if Xi  X1 and Xi  X2 and
. . . and Xi  Xn for all Xj with j  i. From the cumulative distribution function of
the exponential distribution [57], we know that

P (Xi  X1 ) = 1

e

1x

P (Xi > X1 ) = e

1x

P (Xi  X2 ) = 1

e

2x

P (Xi > X2 ) = e

2x

...
P (Xi  Xn ) = 1

...
e

nx

P (Xi > Xn ) = e
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nx

For a given x,

P (min(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) > x) = P (X1 > x) · P (X2 > x) · . . . · P (Xn > x)
= P (X1 > x) · P (X2 > x) · . . . · P (Xn > x)
1x

=e
=e
=e

(

·e

2x

· ... · e

nx

1 + 2 +...+ n )x

x

Given these probabilities, and recalling that from the probability density function
of the exponential distribution the relative probability of a specific value x in an
exponential distribution with rate

is f (x) = e
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x

[57], then the probability that a

specific transition’s firing time Xi = min(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) can be calculated as

P (Xi =min(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn )) = P (Xi  Xj for 1  j  n and j 6= i|Xi = x)
Z 1
ix
=
P (Xi  Xj for 1  j  n and j 6= i|Xi = x) dx
ie
=
=
=
=
=

Z
Z
Z
Z

0

1

ix

ie

ix

0
1
0
ix

ie

0

i

Z

e
i

=

i

Y

P (Xj > x) dx

Y

e

ix

dx

i )x

dx

j6=1

1
0

P (x  Xj for 1  j  n and j 6= i) dx

j6=1

1

=

=

ie

ix

ie
1

x

e

e

(

dx

0
x 1
0

0

1
i

i

which was to be shown.

4.3

PNPSC Example
The following sections discuss the design of the validated PNPSC for a Cross-

Site Scripting attack that this study has developed. After each of the design descriptions an example is provided that will follow a specific traversal through the PNPSC
and show the calculation of cost for both the attacker and the defender.
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4.3.1

CAPEC 63 Cross-Site Scripting
To illustrate the simulation, the CAPEC 63 Cross-Site Scripting PNPSC dia-

gram is shown in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, the net is fairly large and therefore the
example is in four parts. The first explains the Explore Phase of the net, followed by
the Experiment phase, Exploit phase, and ending with the goals phase. In each part
of the diagram an explanation is included to display each type of occurrence that
could take place.
During the first phase of the attack, the explore phase shown in Figure 4.2,
the attacker’s goal is to mark the place aP13, enabling the transition bT1 which will
allow the attacker to proceed to the experiment phase of the attack. With this goal
in mind there are four possible outcomes, (1) the attack will be successful and the
attacker will be able to proceed to the experiment phase, (2) the attacker will fail all
of his/her options to be successful in the explore phase of the attack, (3) the attacker
will fail one of the methods in succeeding with the explore phase and will have the
opportunity to attempt another method (as long as it is available), (4) the attacker
will be detected by the defender and either fail or succeed in that method.
The attack starts with the knowledge that the target client software is one
that allows for scripting communication from remote hosts. The first action taken
by the attacker is to survey the applications for user-controllable inputs (aT1). The
attacker has three methods that he/she can pursue to achieve the ultimate goal of
moving forward to the experiment phase, (1) attempt to spider the website (aT2), (2)
attempt to use proxy tools to record all links (aT5), and (3) attempt to use a browser
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Figure 4.1: CAPEC 63 PNPSC
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Figure 4.2: CAPEC 63 Explore Phase

to manually explore the website (aT8). The defender also has a goal during this phase
and that is to gain knowledge that an attack is taking place. If the defender gains
knowledge that the attacker has attempted all three methods to achieve his/her goal
to move on to the experiment phase then the only choice the attacker will have left is
(aT11) which will take the attacker to a fail state. To run through the example, one
of the methods that the attacker can attempt will be followed to allow for a specific
outcome, and other paths that are similar in each method will be explained.
The choices that the attacker has to begin the explore phase of the attack are
player-controllable and set up with “rates” that the attacker may manipulate. For the
purpose of the example arbitrary rates are used and would later have to be determined
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by subject matter experts. A cost analysis of the attacker and the defender will be
shown in the next section by following the actions that are taken from the beginning
of a new attack to the end.
If the attacker manipulates the transition rates to where aT2 fires first, then
the attacker will be making the attempt to spider the website (aP3). There are three
outcomes from the attacker spidering the website, the attacker may be successful
(aT3), the attacker might fail (aT4), or the defender might detect that spidering is
taking place (aP14). In this scenario, the assumption is made that the attacker fails
to spider the website, having a token fire through aT4 to aP5 and aP2. The token
that is found in aP5 causes for an inhibitor arc to be in place to aT2 which will
not allow for the transition to become enabled for the next attempt to the explore
phase. The reason for the inhibitor arc is so that the attacker is not able to attempt
this method of attack again since he/she has already failed once in their attempt.
However, just because the attacker failed at this attempt does not mean that he/she
is done trying to achieve their attack goal. The attacker could still try to use proxy
tools (aT5), or manually explore the website (aT8). Therefore, a token is found in
aP2 to enable the transitions that will allow for the attacker to attempt a di↵erent
method to succeed in the explore phase.
With a second chance at hand, let’s assume that the enabled transition with
the next highest firing rate is for the attacker to attempt to use a proxy tool to record
all available links (aT5). Having this transition fire will lead to aP6 where the attacker
uses the proxy tool. Here the same three outcomes could occur as with the attacker’s
attempt to spider the website, the attacker might fail, succeed, or a defender will
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detect the attack. Here the assumption is made that the enabled transition with the
highest firing rate is aT13. This transition is one where the defender detects the use
of the proxy tool. At this point aT13, the defender gaining knowledge of the attack,
will fire and a token will be placed in aP15, to document the knowledge that the
defender has gained, and a token will be placed back to aP6. The defender does not
attempt to stop the attack, the defender just becomes aware that something is going
on. Action is not taken because there are times in situations such as these that a
security log could have incorrect information showing a false positive result, therefore
it is not beneficial for the defender to use his/her resources to “block” the attack at
this time. However, the fact that the defender has been made aware that something
is going on could be useful later in the attack and that is the reason why it remains
documented that the defender has knowledge that something is going on. Since the
defender does not block the attack the token at aP6 will now allow for the attacker
to either succeed or fail using the proxy tool. Here we will assume that the transition
firing rate for the attacker to fail is greater than that of the attacker to succeed.
Therefore, the enabled transition aT7 will fire and a token will be placed in aP8 and
another in aP2. The token that is found in aP8 marks the fact that the attacker was
not successful in using proxy tools and therefore an inhibitor arc is placed from aP8
to aT5 so that the transition for this attempt will not be enabled for the attacker
to try again. The token that is found in aP2, now allows for the attacker to either
manually explore websites or fail the explore phase of the attack all together.
The assumption is made that the transition for the attacker to browse the
website manually has the higher firing rate between it and the attacker failing transi57

tion (aT11), therefore aT8 will fire. The place aP9, use of browser attack occurring,
has three outcomes, success, failure, or detection by a defender. Here the transition
that fires is that of a successful use of the browser to manually explore the websites.
A token will be placed in aP10 to display that the browser attack was successful
for later calculations, and a token will be placed on aP13 to demonstrate that the
explore phase has been successful. From here bT1 fires and the attacker moves on
to the experiment phase. Now, before continuing, it should be noted that has the
attacker failed at this method, then a token would have gone back to aP2 and at this
point the only enabled transition would have been aT11 which corresponds to the
attacker failing to explore the system.
Figure 4.3 provides a closer look at the experiment phase of the PNPSC. As
can be noticed, once the attacker starts the experiment phase he/she has di↵erent
methods to go about it. Similar in design as in the explore phase, this particular
experiment phase has four method that can be attempted before the attacker fails to
perform the attack during the experiment phase.
Once the attacker succeeds in the explore phase he/she will be able to move on
to the experiment phase. This phase is very similar to the previous as far as design.
During the experiment phase of the attack there are four possible outcomes, (1) the
attack will be successful and the attacker will be able to proceed to the exploit phase,
(2) the attacker will fail all of his/her options to be successful in the experiment
phase of the attack, (3) the attacker will fail one of the methods in succeeding with
the experiment phase and will have the opportunity to attempt another method (as
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Figure 4.3: CAPEC 63 Experiment Phase

long as it is available), (4) the attacker will be detected by the defender and either
fail or success in that method.
In the experiment phase of the attack the four methods that the attacker can
attempt are (1) to use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of
known URLs (bT2), (2) attempt to use a proxy tool to record results (bT5), (3)
attempt to use probe strings to inject script into user interface entry fields (bT8),
(4) attempt to use injection script into resources (bT11). However, if the attacker is
not successful with any of these methods then the consequence is that he fails the
attack (bT14). Just as with the explore phase of the attack, each method attempted
during the experiment phase have the same outcomes as those of the explore phase.
The attacker may fail a specific method, therefore being allowed to attempt another
method (if possible) and an inhibitor arc blocking the same method from being attempted a second time. The attacker may be detected by a defender however allowed
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to continue their attack attempt, the attacker may succeed in a method and continue
to the next phase, or if the attacker fails all possible methods in the experiment then
the attacker fails the attack as a whole. The main di↵erence, besides an additional
method to complete this phase of the attack, that is found between the explore and
the experiment phases, is that within the experiment phase there are four transitions
that have rates associated to actions that the attacker took during the explore phase.
These four transitions (bT3) attacker successfully injects script via parameters, (bT6)
attacker successfully records results via proxy tool, (bT9) attacker successfully uses
injection scripts in user interface entry fields, and (bT12) attacker successfully uses
injection script into resources, are all influenced by whether or not the attacker was
successful during the explore phase. If any of the three success places found in the explore phase have a token then it will influence the firing rate of the success transitions
that are found in the experiment phase.
At this point the attacker is ready to go through the experiment phase of the
PNPSC. Based on the actions mentioned above that the attacker can perform, it is
assumed that the transition with the highest firing rate is that of using a proxy tool
to record any available information that can be used as part of the attack (bT5), this
will place a token in bP6 where the proxy tool is in use. At this point there are three
enabled transitions that could fire, and the one that is found to have the highest firing
rate is bT6, the successful use of the proxy tool. As can be seen, even though the
attacker failed to use a proxy tool during the explore phase, that does not impact his
success in being able to use a proxy tool at a future action. A token is placed in bP7,
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Figure 4.4: CAPEC 63 Exploit Phase

which will mark the success of using a proxy tool, and a token will mark bP5 which
will allow for the attacker to move forward to the exploit phase.
The next phase of the attack as long as the attacker is successful in the experiment phase is that of exploit, shown in Figure 4.4.
This phase is similar in design to the explore and experiment phases. If the
attacker is successful in the experiment phase he/she will continue the attack and be
able to select a method in which he/she will be able to exploit the system. With
Cross-Site Scripting there are five di↵erent methods that can be attempted before
the attacker fails. The five methods that the attacker is able to attempt are (1) to
load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts and send the retrieved information
to the attacker (cT2), (2) attempt to cause the browser to take commands (cT5), (3)
attempt to load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts to perform actions (cT8),
(4) attempt to load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
(cT11), (5) attempt to load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other
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websites (cT14), otherwise the attacker will have failed the exploit phase (cT17).
As with the previous phases, the exploit phase has the three same outcomes for the
attempts of each method, the attacker can succeed, be detected by defender and
continue, or the attacker may fail one method and can continue to another. The
exploit phase is also similar to the experiment phase with the combined firing rates
of successful transitions. These firing rates are calculated based on whether or not
the attacker has been successful during the experiment phase of the attack.
From all of the possible actions that the attacker can take at this point in the
exploit phase, let’s assume that exposing invalid information to the user (cT14) has
the highest firing rate. This will place a token into cP15 where the attacker is loading
the victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the user. From the
three possible outcomes, transition cT22 is assumed to have the higher firing rate,
therefore the defender detects that there is something going on and a token in placed
in cP23 to flag that the defender has knowledge of something not being right, and
the attacker goes on to actually fail at the attempt to load the victim’s browser with
scripts (cT16). A token is placed in cP17 to flag that the attacker has failed, a token
is sent back to cP1 where the attacker will have the chance to attempt a di↵erent
action, and an inhibitor arc connects to cT14 to not allow the transition to become
enabled again since the attacker has failed at this attempt. The next action that the
attacker will make is to attempt to cause the browser to take commands (cT5), this
will place a token into cP6. Here the attacker is successful and a token is placed into
cP7 to flag his/her success and a token is placed into cP4 which will allow for the
attacker to continue on to the goals phase.
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If the attacker is successful through the exploit phase then he/she will reach
the goal phase of the PNPSC. In this phase there are three outcomes, (1) the attacker
succeeds based on the goal in mind, (2) the attacker is blocked actively or passively,
(3) the attacker fails to succeed with their goal. Once the attacker enters the goal
phase of the attack there are four goals that he/she may have according to CAPEC 63,
(1) the attacker attempts to read data, (2) the attacker attempts to gain privileges,
(3) the attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code, or (4) the attacker attempts
to modify the applications. Once the attacker has selected a goal to achieve, the Petri
net then represents the strategies available to the attacker and defender (dP7). At
this point there are eight enabled transitions, two of those transitions are associated
to previous outcomes from the other phases of the PNPSC. The other four transitions
have rates associated to the attacker failing to achieve the set goal, and the last two
transitions are associated to an intrusion detection system picking up on the attack
and being able to block it or an active defender noticing the attack and being able to
block it without the previous knowledge gathered from the other phases. In Figure 4.5,
dT9 represents the transitions for the attacker to be successful in reaching his/her
goal, the rate for this transition is determined by the success that the attacker had
with the di↵erent methods to exploit the system in the previous phase. The transition
dT10, is one in which the defender monitors the attack, this transition is influenced
by all of the past knowledge that was gained by the defender going all the way back
to the explore phase. Every time a token was placed in the defender detection state,
it impacts the calculation for the transition rate in the goal phase. From having this
knowledge the defender would be capable at this point to block the attacker from
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achieving his/her goal. As long as the defender has not blocked the attacker, and as
long as the attacker has not been successful he/she is capable to continue to attempt
to achieve their goal, hence the “loop back” from dT4.
To continue with an explicit path example, let’s assume that in dT6 the attacker attempts to gain privileges is the transition with the highest firing rate. Therefore, a token will be placed in dP5, which flags the attacker’s attempted goal, and
dP6 ,which flags that a decision has been made by the attacker on which goal to focus
on. At this point, dT8 (attacker fails to gain privileges) is not an enabled transition
because it has two incoming arcs, a token must be found not only in dP5, but also in
dP7 (attacker and defender strategies in play), for the transition to become enabled.
The only currently enabled transition is dT7, where the cyberattack moves into a
portion of the phase where attackers have strategies that can be followed to success,
or from the defenders perspective, to be able to block the attack. The token traverses
from dP6 to dP7. At this point, dT8 is enabled, along with dT9 (the attacker succeeding in the attack), dT10 (the defender gaining knowledge of the attack), or dT12
(the defender passively blocking the attack. The defense block would occur through
some hardware/software device that stops the attack without a human defender being involved in the process. Assuming that dT10 has the highest rating, a token
will be placed into dP9 flagging that the defender has knowledge of the attack, and
now making the transition dT11 (defender blocks attack) enabled together with the
previous passive block, the attacker successful, and the attacker fail transitions. If
the attacker was to fail, then he/she would have the opportunity to select a di↵erent
goal. However, in this example, because the defender has previous knowledge from
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Figure 4.5: CAPEC 63 Goals Phase
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other marked places that an attack may be occurring, the transition to block the
attack is assumed to have the highest firing rate and the attacker is actively blocked
by the firing of transition dT11. There is nothing more that the attacker is capable
of doing.
Now that the traversal of the PNPSC has been explained, the next section will
follow a path based on actual given rates to the transitions and calculate the cost of
both the attacker and the defender by each time step taken.

4.3.2

CAPEC 63 Cross-Site Scripting PNPSC Cost Analysis
In the previous section, di↵erent paths that an attacker might follow were

discussed. In this section, a path followed based on the assumption that transitions
with higher firing rates fired first is analyzed and its cost is calculated with a step by
step explanation of the calculations shown. To provide significant results, multiple
runs and complete description of the attack would be required, these results are just
an illustration of the process.
Table 4.1 displays the transitions, rates, actions and results associated to enabled transitions and the cost associated if the transition fires during the explore
phase of CAPEC 63. Costs marked by “(a)” are those associated to attackers, those
with “(d)” is for the defender. If a transition does not fire there is no cost, if a transition fires and does not have a cost it is because the transition was non-controllable
and a cost is not associated to any player. When the attack begins, the attacker is
aware that the client system allows for scripting communication from remote hosts.
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Table 4.1: Cost Analysis of the Explore Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC 63
Time
1
2

3

4

5

6

Transition
aT1
aT2
aT5
aT11
aT8
aT13
aT6
aT7
aT2
aT5
aT11
aT8
aT9
aT14
aT10
aT9
aT10

Rate
4
4
7
4
6
4
2
5
4
4
6
5
6
1
5
1

Action & Result
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires (token placed in aP8)
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires (token placed in aP16)
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires (token placed in aP10)
Transition enabled - does not fire

Cost

1(a)

1(a)
2(d)

The attacker will survey the application for user-controllable inputs which is
the only enabled transition for action to be taken when the attack begins (aT1).
This transition is not player-controlled and therefore there is no cost associated to it
firing. Once the attacker decides to start the explore phase there will be four enabled
transitions, three of which are considered to be player-controlled by the attacker and
the attacker is capable of manipulating the firing rates to try and influence which
one is fired. Table 4.1 shows the transition rates that have been assigned to the four
actions that can occur. The transition aT11 is not player-controlled because this
is a transition that leads to the failure of the attack. According to the simulation
assumption for this case, the enabled transition with the highest firing rate will be the
one that is fired. aT5 fires and the attacker will attempt to use proxy tools to record
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all available links that can be used in the attack. Since this is an attacker-controlled
transition and one token is moved through it the attacker has a cost of 1. Cost
values are assumed to be equivalent to the number of incoming tokens to the firing
transition. A new set of transitions is enabled and the attacker will be successful or
fail in gathering links. The defender is also able to detect that proxy tools are in use.
Based on the assigned firing rates, the attacker fails to use the proxy tool (aT7), and
a token is placed in aP8 while another token is placed in aP2 and the attacker can
now select a di↵erent method to his/her attack. There is an inhibitor arc between
aP8 and aT5 which means that the attacker cannot attempt to use a proxy tool again
to gather links. The new enabled transitions allow the attacker to attempt to spider
the website or manually explore the website. The attacker has control over these two
transitions while a third one leads to failure of the attack. Based on the firing rates,
the next attempt by the attacker is to manually explore the website for vulnerabilities
(aT8). The attacker’s attempt to use the browser to manually explore the website has
two possible outcomes, the attacker will be successful or fail. There is also the chance
that the defender will pick up on the fact that the attacker is attempting to gather
information. With the given rates, the defender detects the attack (aT14) and a token
is used to mark the place where the defender now has knowledge that something is
occurring (aP16) but is not taking action to stop the attack. The transition where
the defender gains knowledge of the attack is a defender-controlled transition, with
two tokens being used from this transition, the cost to the defender is 2. One of the
tokens is sent back to the place aP2 for the attacker to continue to manually explore
the website (aP9). The successful transition fires next (aT9), one token will mark
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a place of success (aP10) and another will allow for the attack to continue to the
experiment phase with a cost analysis documented in Table 4.2.
When the attacker is successful in the explore phase he/she moves into the
experiment phase by the firing of transition bT1, which makes available to the attacker four transitions under his/her control and one transition that leads to failure
of the attack. The attacker now has the chances of attempt to use a list of cross-site
script probe strings (bT2), use a proxy tool to record vulnerable results (bT5), probe
strings into the user interface entry fields (bT8), use injection scripts (bT11), and if
the attacker is not successful with any of these attempts he/she will fail the attack
during the experiment phase (bT14). Based on the given rates, bT5 will fire and the
attacker will attempt to use a proxy tool to record vulnerability results, with a cost
1. The attacker has now the opportunity to succeed or fail. The defender also has
the opportunity to gain knowledge of what is being done. In the current scenario, the
success of the attacker (bT6) has the highest firing rate, this rate is actually impacted
by previous markings found in the net. During the explore phase the attacker was
successful in manually using the using a browser to explore the website, the token
that is found in this marked place has impacted the value of the rate of this transition, where the given rate of the transition has a value of five added to it. Even
though it was unnecessary as this transition already had the highest firing rate, if it
was not the case, the attackers previous success could have made a di↵erence in the
path which is taken within the PNPSC. With the enabled transition, firing one token
marks success place (bP7) while another token allows for the attacker to continue to
the exploit phase of the attack.
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Table 4.2: Cost Analysis of the Experiment Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC 63
Time
7
8

9

Transition
bT1
bT2
bT5
bT8
bT11
bT14
bT7
bT16
bT6

Rate
1
8
9
7
7
7
2
1
9 (aP10+5)

Action & Result
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires (token placed
in bP7)

Cost

1(a)

Table 4.3 displays the costs associated to the actions in the exploit phase.
The attacker has five methods to exploit the system and the possibility of failure.
Those five actions are to load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts (cT2),
attempt to cause the browser to take attacker commands (cT5), load the users browser
with malicious scripts to perform specific actions(cT8), load the users browser with
malicious scripts to execute requests to other web sites (cT11), and the option to
load scripts on the users browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the
user (cT14). Based on the transition rates the attacker attempts to load the victim’s
browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the user (cT14), this has a cost
of 1 for the attacker. The next enabled transitions correspond to the attacker being
either successful or failing, and the possibility of the defender gaining knowledge of
the exploit attack. In this scenario, the defender gains knowledge of the attack. A
token is stored in a place to track that the knowledge was obtained, and another
token marks the place for the attacker to be successful or fail. The cost for the
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defender gaining this knowledge is 2. With a token back in cP15 where the attacker
is attempting to load the users browser with scripts to provide him/her with invalid
information, the attacker then fails this attempt (firing of cT16). A token will now
mark that this attempt was not successful, and another token will mark the place
for the attacker to attempt a di↵erent method to be successful in the exploit. This
time, instead of five attacker-controlled enabled transitions, the attacker only has four
since he/she cannot attempt to use browser scripts since he/she has already failed at
that attempt. The next enabled transition with the highest rate is (cT5) where the
attacker will try to cause the browser to accept commands. Once again, with this
method to try and achieve the attack the attacker will either succeed or fail, and the
defender will have the ability to gain knowledge of the attack. Based on the rates
given to the transitions, the attacker is actually successful in this attempt (cT6). A
token marks place cP7 to document the success of the exploit attempt, and one token
traverses to allow the attacker to continue on to the goal phase of the attack.
Once the attacker is successful in the exploit phase he/she is able to move
forward to achieve the goal associated to the attack. The costs associated with the
goals phase is given in Table 4.4. With cross-site scripting the attacker has four
di↵erent goals, (1) to read application data, (2) modify application data, (3) execute
unauthorized code, and (4) to gain privileges to the system. Based on the enabled
transitions the attacker may try to achieve his or her goal by modifying application
data (dT16), executing unauthorized code (dT15), reading application information
(dT2), or gaining privileges to the system (dT6). Based on the given firing rates,
the attacker will attempt to modify application data. One token will mark a place
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Table 4.3: Cost Analysis of the Exploit Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC 63
Time
10
11

12

13
14

15

Transition
cT1
cT2
cT5
cT8
cT11
cT17
cT14
cT15
cT16
cT22
cT15
cT16
cT2
cT5
cT8
cT11
cT17
cT14
cT7
cT19
cT6

Rate
8
6
7
5
1
5
9
2 (bP7+1)
4
6
2 (bP7+1)
4
6
7
5
1
5
9
1
2
6 (bP7+1)

Action & Result
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition not enabled
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - does not fire
Transition enabled - fires (token placed in
cP7)

Cost

1(a)

2(d)

1(a)

that holds a flag to show that the modification goal is being attempted (dP11),
the other token moves the attack into an attacker/defender strategy point, this is
where the defender may be able to actively block the attacker. Here there are eight
transitions but not all of them are enabled. Four of the transitions correspond to
the attacker failing at their selected goal, these transitions require two tokens to fire,
one from the attacker/defender strategy and another based on failing to complete
the task associated to the goal. In this scenario where the attacker is pursuing to
modify application data, the enabled transitions are dT13, which is the failure to
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modify the application data, attacker reaching the goal (dT9), defender monitoring
the attack (dT10), defender actively blocking the attack (dT11), or the defender
passively blocking the attack (dT12). With a firing rate of 6, the defender actively
blocks the attacker from completing his/her attack.

Table 4.4: Cost Analysis of the Goals Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC 63
Time
15
16

17
18

Transition
dT1
dT6
dT15
dT16
dT2
dT7
dT8
dT3
dT14
dT9
dT10
dT11
dT12
dT13

Rate
3
4
9
1
2
6
1
9
1
3(cP16 +2)
3
6
4
3

Action & Result
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not
Transition enabled - does not
Transitions enabled - fires
Transition not enabled
Transition not enabled
Transition not enabled
Transition enabled - does not
Transition enabled - does not
Transition not enabled
Transition enabled - fires
Transition enabled - does not

Cost
fire
2(a)
fire
fire

fire
fire

fire

In a final analysis of the cost of this attack, with the rates that were established
for this example, the attacker had a cost of 7 while the defender had a cost of 4 units.

4.4

Summary
In summary, this study has redefined Petri nets to allow for the use of in-

hibitors. With the use of inhibitors, simulations now have the capability to consider
a defense mechanism interrupting an attack. Since resources are required to fulfill
tasks and attackers and defenders must have them available, PNPSC was designed
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to keep track of these resources by analyzing the cost associated to the decisions that
the defender and/or attacker will make. This has been created as an extension to
the formalism proposed by Zakrzewska and Ferragut for their Petri nets with Players
and Strategies. In addition to the expansion of the net, a formal theorem and proof
has been provided for the concept of transitions and firing mechanisms. Lastly, a
simple example for the purposes of illustrating the calculation of cost and impact on
resources was provided based on a piece of a PNPSC for Cross-Site Scripting.
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CHAPTER 5

STRUCTURED FACE VALIDATION OF EXTENDED PETRI NETS
FOR MODELING CYBERATTACKS

5.1

Introduction
With increasing use of Internet-based services, the attack surface presented

for cyberattacks has never been greater1 . Interest in cyber defense has motivated
research in modeling, analysis and prediction of the cost and e↵ectiveness of attack
patterns and tactical defense mechanisms. The purpose of this research program is
to investigate the potential of extensions to existing cyberattack modeling methods
and related methodologies.
These methods begin with attack patterns, loosely codified by the Common
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), modeled as an extension
of Petri nets, and finally simulated and analyzed using a machine learning algorithm
for predictive analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a series of structured validation activities and the resulting analysis and conclusions of those investigations.
1

Some material in this chapter is from [10].
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5.2

Background Information
This chapter documents the validation of a cyberattack modeling technique

proposed by the research team at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, as a portion
of the overall program composed of four projects. The projects are:
• Tools for Simulating and Visualizing Petri Nets – using the Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) as input, attack patterns
are modeled as extended Petri nets. The attack patterns can be represented
in unambiguous representations of the temporal state of an attack. For more
information, see [71].
• An Extended Petri Net Formalism for Modeling Cyberattacks – beginning with
the original definition of the Petri net, and including extensions made by Zakrzewska and Ferragut (known as PNPS), this team has extended the Petri net
formalism once again to include inhibitor arcs and costs [9]. This formalism has
been entitled Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC).
• Machine Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies – once models have been
selected and validated, simulations will be executed in order to develop analytics
to aid in the construction of cyber defense strategies [6].
• Validation of PNPSC models – another portion of this program, of which this
paper is an element, is validation of the PNPSC models. The validation methods
and further validation is discussed further herein.
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5.2.1

CAPEC
As mentioned previously, the CAPEC was selected as the source of the attack

patterns chosen for this program. CAPEC is an ongoing e↵ort to classify, analyze
and itemize the steps in common cyberattacks, and document known mitigations.
CAPEC is constructed under the auspice of MITRE Corporation, a US Government
agency of the Department of Homeland Security. The attack patterns documented
by CAPEC are regularly reviewed and updated, as new or evolving threats emerge.
There are three levels of abstraction defined by CAPEC: Meta, Standard, and
Detailed. Meta attack patterns are intentionally general, and “often void of specific
technology or implementation” [72]. Standard attack patterns are more specific and
procedural. Detailed attack patterns are even more specific, and often include the
composition of other attack patterns [72].
Each of the CAPEC attack patterns has phases including Explore, Experiment,
Exploit, and Attack Motivation-Consequences. Each of these phases contain a subgoal for the attacker, a place on the path to the eventual attacker goal state [3].

5.2.2

PNPSC Nets
Petri nets are a powerful modeling tool for representing the state of a system.

Petri nets can model prerequisites for a transition to another state, modeled by the
markings of places within the net. Petri nets are discussed extensively in [2].
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As previously stated, in [3], Zakrzewska and Ferragut advanced the Petri net to
the extent that adversarial behavior could be modeled and analyzed, by introducing
game theoretic concepts. This paradigm is known as PNPS.
There are two ways in which the team from UAH have extended the work of
Zakrzewska and Ferragut: the costs associated with an attack or defense strategy, as
well as the capability to disable a transition.
Disabling transitions is accomplished by the introduction of an inhibitor arc,
which is a Petri net extension introduced by [73]. Inhibitor arcs are arcs linking a
place to a transition and function such that the transition is disabled whenever the
place is marked.
These further extensions to the Petri net and PNPS are known as Petri nets
with players, strategies and costs (PNPSC). In PNPSC, costs are accumulated by
the attacker or defender when transitions occur or when transition rates are changed.
Players (attackers and defenders) can update rates for transitions they control, and do
so based on marked places within the PNPSC. Transition rates are updated based on
the marking of player observable places. A more complete discussion of the execution
of a PNPSC net can be found in [9].

5.2.3

Machine Learning
As discussed in [6], a primary objective of this program is to be able to predict

the likelihood of the success of an attack, as well as that of a defense mechanism.
Also, predictions are to be made for the rates at which cyberattacks move between
states, and the costs associated with attacking or defending.
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While these rates and costs are considered nominal, the objective is to find and
validate optimal strategies, in terms of costs and timing. The reasons for considering
these rates nominal are an outcome of this face-validation.

5.3

Methodology
The following sections document the methods employed to validate the CAPEC

models and mapping to PNPSC nets.

5.3.1

Choice and Construction of Models
As part of this program, the following CAPEC codified attack patterns have

been mapped to PNPSC nets for simulation and analysis:
• CAPEC 63 – Cross-site scripting - Standard abstraction
• CAPEC 66 – SQL injection - Standard abstraction
• CAPEC 163 – Spear phishing - Detailed abstraction
• CAPEC 169 – Footprinting - Meta abstraction
The PNPSCs were constructed by the authors over several months and several
iterations. Each net was selected from CAPEC based on the OWASP Top 10 list for
cybersecurity vulnerabilities or supporting activities that can lead to a compromised
system [74]. The nets were constructed, reviewed, and modified multiple times each
before considering validation.
Initial verification the of Petri nets was performed in [61] and [5]. These e↵orts
involved building the Petri net and performing the attack as detailed. While these
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were successfully executed, the Petri nets were significantly simpler. Additionally, the
nets that were tested did not contain the features of PNPSCs. They primarily focused
on the execution of the attack only and not on the defender’s potential actions. The
validation e↵ort of this paper focuses on all aspects of the PNPSC, such as multiple
players and notional costs.

5.3.2

Structured Face Validation
This paper documents subsequent validation of these nets for research. The

method employed was a structured face-validation, as documented in [60].
Note that face-validation, while not as strong as static or formal validation
methods, properly structured validation activities can be very e↵ective at identifying
the “strengths and weaknesses” of the models [60]. In the next section, the methods employed to validate the CAPEC attack patterns and related PNPSC models is
presented.

5.3.3

Verification
A validation packet was created for the face validation activities, consisting of

• A series of questions intended to assess the level of expertise of the subject
matter experts charged with validating the modeled attack patterns
• For each of the CAPEC attack patterns, the packet included the following:
– A printout of the CAPEC attack pattern from the MITRE CAPEC website.
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– A series of diagrams, each a graphical representation of the PNPSC mapping of the CAPEC.
– A series of tables describing the places, transitions, associated rates and
rate updates based on PNPSC state.
– A questionnaire with 14 questions on a Likert scale intended to assess the
validity of aspects of the models used, followed by an open ended question
requesting suggestions for improvements that could be made.
Prior to the validation activities, the validation process was tested and executed by a member of the faculty at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, a
cybersecurity researcher. The entire validation process was executed with the UAH
faculty member.
This preliminary test was successful in that several deficiencies were identified
in the process. The deficiencies included
• Key constructs and concepts that a person unfamiliar with Petri nets would
need to know were omitted.
• Clearly detailing what the evaluator was supposed to be doing as well as the
description of how the nets were developed was also missing.
These errors and omissions were corrected before the subject matter experts
were engaged during the validation activities. The results from this preliminary evaluation were discarded. The deficiencies found during this event led to misunderstandings of the expectations.
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5.3.4

Validation Activities
Two validation activities were conducted, one in Huntsville, Alabama on April

9, 2018, and another in Nashville, Tennessee on April 27, 2018. Between these two
activities, a total of fourteen subject matter experts in cybersecurity were engaged.
There were at least three companies involved, representing government, higher education and healthcare. Prior to beginning their assessment of the Validation Packets,
the subject matter experts were given a short briefing on
• The research program
• CAPEC
• Petri nets
• PNPSC nets
• Expectations of the validation process
• How to complete the activities.
In these validation activities, the same materials were used that were verified and
corrected at UAH.
In both locations, a member of the research team that was unknown to the
subject matter experts prior to the activity delivered the briefing. During the assessment, the subject matter experts were allowed to discuss the material openly and
consult the research team on any matter of confusion or clarification. Every e↵ort
was made to ensure that the two activities were similar. The goal of maintaining
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similarity was to reduce the probability of bias being introduced into the validation
exercise.
The experts evaluated the PNPSCs for two hours. During that two-hour
period, questions were encouraged, repeated to the entire group and answered for the
entire group of subject matter experts, in order to ensure common understanding.
During the evaluation, the experts identified two errors in the validation packets:
• An extra arc transition on one net.
• The mislabeling of a transition/place pair.
In both cases, the errors were corrected and the subject matter experts were
informed.

5.3.5

Qualification of Subject Matter Experts
As mentioned above, the subject matter experts were asked some demograph-

ics questions. The results of those questions are summarized in Appendix A.
The experts were selected from a government research laboratory that focuses
on applied cybersecurity, and from a group of practicing cybersecurity engineers and
leaders, working in healthcare and education. These experts were diverse in levels of
experience, education, as well as how often they engage in cybersecurity activities.
The majority of the experts had little experience with Petri nets. All of the subject matter experts have 5+ years of experience in cybersecurity, at large, multi-site
employers, with significant cybersecurity challenges.
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5.3.6

Testing Method
For each of the four CAPEC attack patterns modeled as PNPSC nets, the

following statements were evaluated by the subject matter experts:
1. You are familiar with the attack pattern
2. The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of view.
3. The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that an attacker can
perform.
4. The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions that a defender can
perform.
5. The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and actions that
can be performed.
6. Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an attacker can do.
7. Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a defender can do.
8. The Petri Net as whole accurately represent things that occur during the given
cybersecurity attack.
9. The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.
10. The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
11. The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
12. The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the attacker/defender.
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13. The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect the costs for this net.
14. The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct enough way to
be useful for research.
The subject matter experts assessed these statements using the following Likert scale:
1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither Agree or Disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree
The results were tested statistically using the normal approximation to a binomial proportion where responses  3 was interpreted as the subject matter expert
disagreed with the statement, and responses > 3 interpreted as the response was in
agreement. Note that this is a conservative interpretation of the Likert scale, in that
3 corresponds to “Neither Agree or Disagree”.
This method is considered statistically valid if both of the following are true:

np > 5

n(1

p) > 5
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where p is the probability of success, meaning a response > 3, and n was
the number of respondents. On each submitted survey, all questions were answered.
The value of p was arbitrarily assigned the value 0.5, so p = 1

p. The number of

completed surveys varied some by CAPEC attack pattern, corresponding to the value
of n. Table 5.1 summarizes the confirmation of the statistical validity of the test.

Table 5.1: Statistical Validity
CAPEC
CAPEC
CAPEC
CAPEC
CAPEC

Attack Pattern
63 - Cross-Site Scripting
66 - SQL Injection
163 - Spear Phishing
169 - Footprinting

n
11
12
13
11

The binomial proportion of a sample is computed

p̂ =

number of successes
.
number of responses

Denote n ⌘ number of responses.
For a binomial proportion, the mean

µ = p = 0.5

and the variance
2

=

p(1

p)
n

,

where p is the probability of success. Recall the assumption p = 0.5.
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p
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

np
5.5
6
6.5
5.5

Because we are approximating the discrete variable p̂ with the normal distribution, we substitute the continuous, normally distributed variable x.
The null hypothesis is that the group disagreed with the statement. So, we
seek
P (p̂

0.5) ⇡ P (x

0.5) = P z

0.5 0.5
q
0.52
n

!

= P (z > 0)

The p-value is the cumulative probability corresponding to the value of z. The
test strategy calls for 95% confidence, so whenever the p-value is greater than 0.05,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and deduce that the test is inconclusive. The pvalues represent the probability of a Type I error, or a case where the null hypothesis
is rejected, and is, in fact, true.

5.4

Validation Results
The null hypothesis related to each statement was that the group disagreed

with the statement. Appendix A contains summaries of the analysis of the survey
results for the related CAPEC attack pattern modeled by PNPSC.
The results presented in Table A.6 suggests that for CAPEC 63 – Cross-Site
Scripting, the subject matter experts generally agree with the validity of the attack
pattern, represented as the CAPEC model and the PNPSC net, with the exception
of rates and costs. Notably, many organizations consider this data sensitive, so that
data for input modeling is rarely available.
This finding related to rates and costs is consistent with the subject matter
expert assessment for all four CAPEC attack patterns modeled in this study.
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Similar to the results in Table A.6, the results presented in Table A.7 suggests
that for CAPEC 66 – SQL Injection, the subject matter experts generally agree with
the validity of the attack pattern, represented as the CAPEC model and the PNPSC
net, with the exception of rates and costs.
Similar to the results in Tables A.6 and A.7, the results presented in Table A.8
suggests that for CAPEC 163 – Spear Phishing, the subject matter experts generally
agree with the validity of the attack pattern, represented as the CAPEC model and
the PNPSC net, with the exception of rates and costs.
The survey results for CAPEC 163 di↵ered from the results for the other
attack patterns in regards to one statement: “The CAPEC Entry accurately models
the specified cyberattack.” The subject matter experts responses failed to reject
the null hypothesis for this statement. Comments from the subject matter experts
suggest that there may be concerns about the completeness of CAPEC 163.
The results of CAPEC 169 – Footprinting were interesting in that while analysis of the responses to statements regarding rates and costs resulted in rejection of
the null hypothesis, responses to statement about the Petri net as a whole and the
CAPEC attack pattern were also rejected. The results are presented in Table A.9.
Notably, CAPEC 169 is the only example of an attack pattern at the Meta
level of abstraction. As stated previously, Meta attack patterns are very general in
nature, and can represent a number of attack patterns with similar methods, goals
and objectives. The methods and technologies can be vastly di↵erent.
For this reason, the research team modeled the Explore phase of some related
attack patterns along with CAPEC 169, in order to provide sufficient detail for an as88

sessment. All child attack patterns were not included. This may have led to confusion
among the subject matter experts, and partially explain the results.

5.5

Summary
The purpose of this paper is to document the results gathered during a struc-

tured face validation activity. This activity was designed to measure the validity of
PNPSC nets constructed from CAPEC codified attack patterns, and ascertain validity for research. In general, the validation is considered a success in that some errors
were corrected in the PNPSC nets, and that three of four models were assessed to be
valid for research, suggesting the method is valid within limits.
The PNPSC net constructed from CAPEC 169 – Footprinting was the only
PNPSC net that failed validation on more than three statements, and also the only
CAPEC attack pattern that was a Meta abstraction pattern. All Detailed and Standard abstraction patterns were validated.
Rates and costs failed validation for all four models. The rate and cost calculations will be considered notional, unless a better method of justifying the rate and
cost calculations, as well as the initial values is discovered.
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CHAPTER 6

MACHINE LEARNING CYBERATTACK AND DEFENSE
STRATEGIES

6.1

Introduction
Much of the developed world is dependent on computers and their enabling

technologies1 . From the personal desktop to the latest cell phone, software and hardware support the functioning of society. Whether they realize it or not, many people
implicitly trust their electronics with every part of their daily activities. This creates
an inherent vulnerability and an opening for malicious actors to exploit. Cybersecurity is the theory and practice of attacking, or blocking attacks, on computer systems.
Cybersecurity can be seen as a competitive game with two players. One player,
the attacker, is attempting to find and exploit vulnerabilities in a computer system
so as to gain access, steal data, or perform malicious actions. The other player,
the defender, is attempting to prevent attacks. The defender must be continuously
vigilant because an attacker will not announce when an attack has commenced. This
concept of a cyberattack as a competition is the motivating idea for the modeling
1

Some material in this chapter is from [6].
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approach described in this paper. Two adversarial players attempt to take select
actions to achieve their competing goals.
Petri nets were first formalized by C. A. Petri in 1962 [1]. Petri nets can model
discrete, dynamic, and distributed systems. The semantics of Petri nets are oriented
towards modeling sequence, concurrency, and synchronization in processes, networks,
and workflows [56]. The Petri nets formalism has proven to be highly flexible and
extensible, and many applications and extensions exist [2].
An extension of Petri nets, referred to as PNPS nets (Petri nets with players
and strategies), formalized the idea of competing players and was applied to cyberattacks in 2011 [3]. In the current work that PNPS formalism was enhanced to resolve
some ambiguities in its original definition and extended to add a formal representation of the relative cost of the actions taken by the competitors; the new formalism
is referred to as Petri nets with players, strategies, and costs (PNPSC). The PNPSC
formalism is able to model the essential elements of cyberattacks, including computer
systems, their vulnerabilities, the actions taken by competing players to exploit or
eliminate those vulnerabilities, and the relative costs of taking those actions [8].
PNPSC nets model the dynamic states of the system and the events that occur
during an attack on that system as markings and transition firings in the PNPSC net
respectively. The formalism models the attacker and defender as competing players
who may independently observe the marking of a player-specific subset of the net,
and based on the observed marking, act by changing the stochastic firing rates of
a player-specific subset of the transitions, so as to achieve their competing goals.
Transition rate changes by a player incur a cost to that player.
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The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) database,
developed and maintained by MITRE, documents known cyberattack patterns [72].
In the current work, PNPSC nets were constructed to model three of those patterns,
cross-site scripting (CAPEC 66), spear phishing (CAPEC 163), and structured query
language (SQL) injection (CAPEC 66). Although those three patterns were chosen
for the current work, PNPSC nets are expected to be able to model most or all of
the CAPEC attack patterns [9]. The three models used were validated by a panel of
cybersecurity experts in a structured face validation process [10].
In a PNPSC net, players compete by changing the firing rates of the stochastic
transitions in the net that they control. The rule that specifies how a player changes
the rates, given an observed marking, is termed a strategy. In the current work, a
reinforcement learning algorithm was used to learn to improve the players’ strategies
over time. The reinforcement learning algorithm’s reward is based on how e↵ectively
a strategy makes progress towards a player’s goal.
The work described in this paper addresses the following research questions:
1. Can the features of a Petri net model be mapped to the framework of a reinforcement learning algorithm?
1.1. Does the reward need to be based on only reaching the ending node or
should it be based on reaching a new node?
2. Can a reinforcement learning algorithm be implemented in a Petri net simulator
in order to learn cyberattack and defense strategies?
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2.1. Can a reinforcement learning algorithm vary policies to determine the best
policy of an attacker to maximize their reward, i.e., attack a computer
system with a cyberattack?
2.2. Can a reinforcement learning algorithm vary policies to determine the best
policy of a defender to maximize their reward, i.e., defend a computer
system against a cyberattack?
3. How robust are cyberattack and defense strategies produced by reinforcement
learning?
3.1. In essence, how well do these strategies perform when the adversary’s strategy changes?

6.2

Petri Net Models of Cyberattacks
As was shown in [3], Petri nets can be used to model cyberattacks. The

following section details how Petri nets, specifically PNPSCs as detailed in Chapter
4, were used to model three cyberattacks described by MITRE’s CAPEC Database
version 2.11.
For this research, we set player-controlled transitions to have rates of either
zero or ten. This allowed a player to deactivate a transition, ensuring that it never
fires, or activate a transition and give it the opportunity to fire.
A validated Petri net model of cross-site scripting attacks is given in Figure 6.1—Figure 6.4 from [9]. The figures represent, respectively, the explore, experiment, exploit, and goal phases as described in [72]. In Figure 6.5—Figure 6.8, a
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validated Petri net model of spear phishing attacks is presented [72]. Likewise, in
Figure 6.9—Figure 6.12 a model of SQL injection is given [72]. The Petri nets were
validated by a panel of subject matter experts. The experts evaluated the models
to determine if CAPEC was an accurate representation of the specified cyberattack,
if the Petri net accurately represented the CAPEC entry, and if the Petri net was
an accurate representation of the specified cyberattack. The Petri nets for this research, CAPEC 63, 163, and 66 were agreed upon by the subject matter experts
to be of sufficient quality to be useful for research [10]. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 list the
places and transitions respectively for the cross-site scripting explore phase shown
in Figure 6.1. Similarly, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are associated with Figure 6.2, the experiment stage of cross-site scripting. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 correspond to the exploit
phase shown in Figure 6.3. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 detail the places and transitions of
the goal phase of cross-site scripting as shown in Figure 6.4. Likewise, Tables 6.9
and 6.10 list each place and transition for the spear phishing explore phase given in
Figure 6.5. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 correspond to the experiment phase shown in Figure 6.6. Tables 6.13 and 6.14 are associated with the exploit phase given in Figure 6.7.
Tables 6.15 and 6.16 correlate to the places and transitions of the goal phase of spear
phishing as given in Figure 6.8. Following a similar pattern as the previous two attacks, SQL injection places and transitions are defined in Table 6.17—Table 6.24 with
their corresponding figures given in Figure 6.9—Figure 6.12. Additional details on
these models can be found in [9].
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Figure 6.1: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Explore Phase
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Table 6.1: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Explore Phase Places
Place
aP1

Description
Target client software must be a client that allows scripting communication
from remote hosts
Explore Phase of the Attack Occurring
Spidering website occurring
Spidering successful
Spidering websites failed
The use of proxy tool occurring
Proxy tool successful
Use of proxy tool failed
Use of browser attack occurring
Use of browser successful
Use of browser attack is failed
Explore phase attack failed
Survey application successful
Defender detected spidering
Defender detected proxy tool use
Defender detected browser exploration

aP2
aP3
aP4
aP5
aP6
aP7
aP8
aP9
aP10
aP11
aP12
aP13
aP14
aP15
aP16

Table 6.2: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Explore Phase Transitions
Transition
aT1
aT2
aT3
aT4
aT5
aT6
aT7
aT8
aT9
aT10
aT11
aT12
aT13
aT14

Description
Attacker surveys the application for user-controllable inputs
Attacker attempts to spider website
Attacker successfully spiders web sites
Attacker fails in spidering website
Attacker attempts to use proxy tool to record all links
Attacker successfully use proxy tool to record links
Attacker fails to use proxy tool
Attacker attempts to use a browser to manually explore the
website
Attacker successfully use a browser to manually explore the
website
Attacker fails to use browser attack
Attacker fails in the explore phase
Defender detects spidering
Defender detects proxy tool use
Defender detects browser exploration
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Rates
4
4
2
2
7
2
5
2
5
1
8
2
4
6

Figure 6.2: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Experiment Phase
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Table 6.3: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Experiment Phase Places
Place
bP1
bP2
bP3
bP4
bP5
bP6
bP7
bP8
bP9
bP10
bP11
bP12
bP13
bP14
bP15
bP16
bP17
bP18
bP19

Description
Experiment phase of the attack occurring
Use of injected script in parameters occurring
Use of injected script in parameters successful
Use of injected script in parameters flag
Potential entry points for XSS vulnerability is identified
Proxy tool to record results occurring
Proxy tool to record results occurring successful
Proxy tool to record results occurring flag
Injection script into UI entry fields occurring
XSS probe string to inject script into UI entry fields successful
XSS probe string to inject script into UI entry fields flag
Injection script into resources occurring
XSS probe string to inject script into resources successful
XSS probe string to inject script into resources flag
Experiment phase attack failed
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs occurring
Defender detected use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of
XSS probes occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI
entry fields occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by the application occurring
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Table 6.4: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Experiment Phase Transitions
Transition
bT1
bT2
bT3
bT4
bT5
bT6
bT7
bT8
bT9
bT10
bT11
bT12
bT13
bT14
bT15
bT16
bT17
bT18

Description
Attacker moves to experiment phase
Attack attempts to use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script in parameters of known URLs
Attacker successfully injects script via parameters
Attacker fails to inject script via parameters
Attacker attempts to use a proxy tool to record results
Attacker successfully records results via proxy tool
Attacker fails to proxy tool to record results
Attacker attempts to use probe strings to inject script into UI
entry fields
Attacker successfully uses injection script into UI entry fields
Attacker fails to use injection script into UI entry fields
Attacker attempts to use injection script into resources
Attacker successfully uses injection script into resources
Attacker fails to use injection script into resources
Attacker fails in the experiment phase
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script in parameters of known URLs occurring
Defender detected use a proxy tool to record results of manual
input of XSS probes occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into UI entry fields occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into resources accessed by the application occurring
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Rates
1
8
7
7
9
9
2
7
4
2
7
5
8
7
5
1
3
8

Figure 6.3: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Exploit Phase
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Table 6.5: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Exploit Phase Places
Place
cP1
cP2
cP3
cP4
cP5
cP6
cP7
cP8
cP9
cP10
cP11
cP12
cP13
cP14
cP15
cP16
cP17
cP18
cP19

cP20

cP21
cP22

cP23

Description
Exploit phase of the attack occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info successful
Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info flag
Exploit phase successful
Browser takes command occurring
Browser takes command successful
Browser takes command flag
Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions successful
Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions flag
Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
successful
Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
flag
Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user successful
Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user flag
Exploit phase attack failed
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded
by the victim’s browser and sends document information to the attacker
occurring
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute
appropriately occurring
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded
by the victim’s browser and performs actions on the same web site occurring
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites occurring
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded
by the victim’s browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid information
to the user on the current web page occurring
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Table 6.6: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Exploit Phase Transitions
Transition
cT1
cT2
cT3
cT4
cT5
cT6
cT7
cT8
cT9
cT10
cT11
cT12
cT13
cT14
cT15
cT16
cT17
cT18
cT19
cT20
cT21
cT22

Description
Attacker moves to exploit phase
Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with malicious
scripts and sent to attacker
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts and
send info
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts and send
info
Attacker attempts to cause browser to take command
Attacker successfully causes browser to take command
Attacker fails to cause browser to take command
Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with malicious
scripts to perform actions
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to
perform actions
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to perform
actions
Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with scripts to
execute requests to other web sites
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to
execute requests to other web sites
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to execute
requests to other websites
Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with scripts to
expose invalid info to the user
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to
expose invalid info to the user
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to expose
invalid info to the user
Attacker fails in the exploit phase
Defender detects JavaScript that sends document information
to the attacker occurring
Defender detects JavaScript that takes commands from an
attacker’s to execute appropriately occurring
Defender detects JavaScript that performs actions on the same
web site occurring
Defender detects JavaScript that causes the browser to execute request to other web sites occurring
Defender detects JavaScript that exposes attacker-modified
invalid information to the user on the current web page occurring
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Rates
8
6
1
2
7
6
1
5
9
5
1
5
8
9
2
4
5
7
2
5
2
6

Figure 6.4: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Goals Phase
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Table 6.7: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Goals Phase Places
Place
dP1
dP2
dP3
dP4
dP5
dP6
dP7
dP8
dP9
dP10
dP11
dP12

Description
Goal phase of the attack occurring
Read application data flag
Failed attack
Goal phase failed
Gain privileges flag
Goal decided
Attacker/Defender strategies
Goal successful
Defense has knowledge of system attack
Attacker’s goal blocked
Modify application data flag
Execute unauthorized code flag

Table 6.8: Cross-Site Scripting Petri Net Goals Phase Transitions
Transition
dT1
dT2
dT3
dT4
dT5
dT6
dT7
dT8
dT9
dT10
dT11
dT12
dT13
dT14
dT15
dT16

Description
Attacker moves to goal phase
Attacker attempts to read app
Attacker fails to read app data
Attacker tries again
Attacker fails at goal attempt
Attacker attempts to gain privileges
Attack moves to Attacker/Defender strategies
Attacker fails to gain privileges
Attacker succeeds in reaching goal
Defender monitors attack
Defender blocks actively
Defender blocks passively
Attacker fails to modify application data
Attacker fails to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to modify app
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Rates
3
2
9
6
3
4
6
1
5
3
6
4
3
1
1
9

Figure 6.5: Spear Phishing Petri Net Explore Phase
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Table 6.9: Spear Phishing Petri Net Explore Phase Places
Place
aP1
aP2
aP3
aP4
aP5
aP6
aP7
aP8
aP9
aP10
aP11
aP12
aP13
aP14
aP15
aP16
aP17
aP18
aP19
aP20

Description
Attack Prerequisites: None
Conduct web searching research of target occurring
Conduct web searching research of target successful
Conduct web searching research of target attack done
Identify trusted associates, colleagues and friends of target occurring
Identify trusted associates, colleagues and friends of target successful
Identify trusted associates, colleagues and friends of target done
Utilize social engineering attack patterns such as Pretexting occurring
Utilize social engineering attack patterns such as Pretexting successful
Utilize social engineering attack patterns such as Pretexting done
Dumpster diving occurring
Dumpster diving successful
Dumpster diving attack done
Collect social information via traditional sources occurring
Collect social information via traditional sources successful
Collect social information via traditional sources done
Collect social information via Non-traditional sources occurring
Collect social information via Non-traditional sources successful
Collect social information via Non-traditional sources done
Explore phase done

106

Table 6.10: Spear Phishing Petri Net Explore Phase Transitions
Transition
aT1
aT2
aT3
aT4
aT5
aT6
aT7
aT8
aT9
aT10
aT11
aT12
aT13
aT14

Description
Attacker attempts to obtain useful contextual detailed information about the targeted user or organization
Attacker unable to conduct web searching research of target
Attacker able to conduct web searching research of target
Attacker unable to identify trusted associates, colleagues and
friends of target
Attacker able to identify trusted associates, colleagues and
friends of target
Attacker unable to utilize social engineering attack patterns
such as Pretexting
Attacker able to utilize social engineering attack patterns such
as Pretexting
Attacker unable to collect social information via dumpster diving
Attacker able to collect social information via dumpster diving
Attacker unable to collect social information via traditional
sources
Attacker able to collect social information via traditional
sources
Attacker unable to collect social information via Nontraditional sources
Attacker able to collect social information via Non-traditional
sources
Attacker moves to the experiment phase
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Rates
2
5
9
7
9
2
10
8
3
8
3
7
2
10

Figure 6.6: Spear Phishing Petri Net Experiment Phase
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Table 6.11: Spear Phishing Petri Net Experiment Phase Places
Place
bP1
bP2
bP3
bP4
bP5
bP6
bP7
bP8
bP9
bP10
bP11
bP12
bP13
bP14
bP15
bP16
bP17
bP18

Description
Experiment phase of the attack occurring
Experiment phase done
Obtain domain name and certificate to spoof legitimate site occurring
Obtain domain name successful
Obtain domain name attempt done
Obtain SSL certificate successful
Obtain domain name and SSL certificate attempt done
Duplication of website occurring
Spidering occurring
Spidering successful
Manually save copies of required web pages occurring
Manually saving copies of website successful
Create new web pages occurring
Creating new web pages successful
Duplication of website attempt done
Variants of the website occurring
Variant of website successful
Variant of the website attempt done
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Table 6.12: Spear Phishing Petri Net Experiment Phase Transitions
Transition
bT1
bT2
bT3
bT4
bT5
bT6
bT7
bT8
bT9
bT10
bT11
bT12
bT13
bT14
bT15
bT16
bT17
bT18
bT19
bT20
bT21
bT22

Description
Attacker moves to experiment phase
Attacker forego experiment options
Attacker attempts to spoof site
Attacker able to obtain domain
Attacker unable to obtain domain
Attacker able to obtain SSL certificate
Attacker unable to obtain SSL certificate
Attacker moves to the exploit phase
Attacker foregoes obtaining domain name and SSL certificate
Attack attempts to spider website
Attacker able to spider
Attacker unable to spider
Attacker attempts to manually save copies of website
Attacker able to save copies of web pages
Attacker unable to save copies of web pages
Attacker attempts to create new web pages
Attacker able to create new web pages
Attacker unable to create new web pages
Attacker foregoes duplication of website
Attacker able to create variant of website
Attacker unable to create variant of website
Attacker foregoes creating variant of website
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Rates
7
8
4
7
2
1
10
1
6
8
2
8
6
6
4
1
8
2
1
7
5
10

Figure 6.7: Spear Phishing Petri Net Exploit Phase
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Table 6.13: Spear Phishing Petri Net Exploit Phase Places
Place
cP1
cP2
cP3
cP4
cP5
cP6
cP7
cP8
cP9
cP10
cP11

Description
Exploit phase of the attack occurring
Exploit phase attack aborted
Spoofed email attack occurring
Spoofed email attack successful
Spoofed email attack flag
Exploit phase done
Phishing link in online forum attack occurring
Phishing link in online forum attack successful
Phishing link in online forum attack flag
Defender detected spoofed email
Defender detected phishing link in online forum

Table 6.14: Spear Phishing Petri Net Exploit Phase Transitions
Transition
cT1
cT2
cT3
cT4
cT5
cT6
cT7
cT8
cT9
cT10

Description
Attacker moves to exploit phase
Attacker gives up in the exploit phase
Attacker attempts to spoof site
Attacker able to spoof site
Attacker unable to spoof site
Attacker attempts to attack via phishing link
Attacker able to attack via phishing link
Attacker unable to attack via phishing link
Defender detects spoofed email
Defender detects phishing link in online forum
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Rates
3
4
4
4
8
9
8
7
2
3

Figure 6.8: Spear Phishing Petri Net Goals Phase
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Table 6.15: Spear Phishing Petri Net Goals Phase Places
Place
dP1
dP2
dP3
dP4
dP5
dP6
dP7
dP8
dP9
dP10
dP11
dP12

Description
Goal phase of the attack occurring
Read application data flag
Failed attack
Goal phase failed
Gain privileges flag
Goal decided
Attacker/Defender strategies
Goal successful
Defense has knowledge of system attack
Attacker’s goal blocked
Modify application data flag
Execute unauthorized code flag

Table 6.16: Spear Phishing Petri Net Goals Phase Transitions
Transition
dT1
dT2
dT3
dT4
dT5
dT6
dT7
dT8
dT9
dT10
dT11
dT12
dT13
dT14
dT15
dT16

Description
Attacker moves to goal phase
Attacker attempts to read app
Attacker fails to read app data
Attacker tries again
Attacker aborts goal attempt
Attacker attempts to gain privileges
Attack moves to Attacker/Defender strategies
Attacker fails to gain privileges
Attacker succeeds in reaching goal
Defender monitors attack
Defender blocks actively
Defender blocks passively
Attacker fails to modify application data
Attacker fails to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to modify app

114

Rates
8
10
2
2
3
1
2
2
3
10
2
5
4
7
9
2

Figure 6.9: SQL Injection Petri Net Explore Phase
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Table 6.17: SQL Injection Petri Net Explore Phase Places
Place
aP1
aP2
aP3
aP4
aP5
aP6
aP7
aP8
aP9
aP10
aP11
aP12

Description
SQL queries used by the application to store, retrieve, or modify data
User Controllable Input that is not Properly Validated by the Application
as part of SQL Queries
Explore Phase of the Attack Occuring
Spidering Occuring
Spidering Successful
Spidering Attempt Complete
Sniffing Occuring
Sniffing Successful
Sniffing Attempt Complete
Defender Detected Sniffing
Survey Application Complete
Defender Detected Spidering

Table 6.18: SQL Injection Petri Net Explore Phase Transitions
Transition
aT1
aT2
aT3
aT4
aT5
aT6
aT7
aT8
aT9
aT10
aT11

Description
Attacker surveys functionality exposed by the application
Attacker attempts to spider website
Attacker succeeds in spidering
Attacker fails in spidering
Attacker completes Explore phase via spidering
Attacker attempts to sni↵ network communications
Attacker fails in sniffing
Attacker succeeds in sniffing
Defender Detects Sniffing Occurring
Attacker completes Explore phase via sniffing
Defender Detects Spidering Occurring
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Rates
3
9
6
9
6
8
8
5
4
2
8

Figure 6.10: SQL Injection Petri Net Experiment Phase

Table 6.19: SQL Injection Petri Net Experiment Phase Places
Place
bP1
bP2
bP3
bP4
bP5
bP6
bP7
bP8
bP9
bP10
bP11
bP12
bP13
bP14
bP15
bP16
bP17
bP18
bP19

Description
Experiment phase of the attack occurring
Use of web browser attack occurring
Use of web browser attack successful
Experiment phase of the attack successful
Use of web browser attack flag
Use of web application debugging tool occurring
Use of web application debugging tool successful
Web application debugging tool flag
Use of network-level packet injection tool occurring
Use of network-level packet injection tool successful
Use of network-level packet injection tool flag
Use of modified client attack occurring
Use of modified client successful
Use of modified client flag
Experiment phase failed
Defender Detected Web Browser Attack
Defender Detected Web Application Debugging Tool Use
Defender Detected Network Level Packet Injection Tool Use
Defender Detected Modified Web Client Use
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Table 6.20: SQL Injection Petri Net Experiment Phase Transitions
Transition
bT1
bT2
bT3
bT4
bT5
bT6
bT7
bT8
bT9
bT10
bT11
bT12
bT13
bT14
bT15
bT16
bT17
bT18

Description
Attacker moves to experiment phase
Use web browser to inject input through text fields
Attacker succeeds in web browser attack
Attacker fails to use web browser
Use a web application debugging tool
Attacker succeeds in debugging tool attack
Attacker fails in using debugging tool
Use network-level packet injection tool
Attacker succeeds in using network-level packet injection tool
Attacker fails in using network-level packet injection tool
Use modified client
Attacker succeeds in using modified client
Attacker fails in using modified client
Attacker gives up in experiment phase
Defender Detects Web Browser Attack Occurring
Defender Detects Web Application Debugging Tool Use Occurring
Defender Detects Network Level Packet Injection Tool Use
Occurring
Defender Detects Modified Web Client Use Occurring
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Rates
1
10
4
6
5
10
10
8
10
4
9
7
3
2
8
1
1
6

Figure 6.11: SQL Injection Petri Net Exploit Phase

Table 6.21: SQL Injection Petri Net Exploit Phase Places
Place
cP1
cP2
cP3
cP4
cP5
cP6
cP7
cP8
cP9
cP10
cP11
cP12
cP13
cP14
cP15
cP16
cP17
cP18
cP19

Description
Exploit phase of the attack occurring
Exploit phase aborted
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet attack occurring
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet attack successful
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet attack flag
Exploit phase successful
Add logic to query attack occurring
Add logic to query attack successful
Add logic to query flag
Blind SQL Injection attack occurring
Blind SQL Injection attack successful
Blind SQL Injection attack flag
Stacking queries: (DOS) attack occurring
Stacking queries: (DOS) attack successful
Stacking queries: (DOS) attack flag
Defender Detected Use of SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
Defender Detected Added Logic to Query
Defender Detected Blind SQL Injection Techniques
Defender Detected Stacked Queries (Denial of Service Attempt)
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Table 6.22: SQL Injection Petri Net Exploit Phase Transitions
Transition
cT1
cT2
cT3
cT4
cT5
cT6
cT7
cT8
cT9
cT10
cT11
cT12
cT13
cT14
cT15
cT16
cT17
cT18

Description
Attacker moves to exploit phase
Attacker unable to exploit
Attacker uses SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
Attacker succeeds in using SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
Attacker fails in using SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
Attacker adds logic to query
Attacker succeeds in adding logic to query
Attacker fails in adding logic to query
Attacker uses Blind SQL Injection techniques
Attacker succeeds in using Blind SQL Injection techniques
Attacker fails in using Blind SQL Injection techniques
Attacker tries stacking queries: (DOS)
Attacker succeeds in stacking queries: (DOS)
Attacker fails in stacking queries: (DOS)
Defender Detects Use of SQL Injection Cheat Sheet Occurring
Defender Detects Added Logic to Query Occurring
Defender Detects Blind SQL Injection Techniques Occurring
Defender Detects Stacked Queries (Denial of Service Attempt)
Occurring
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Rates
10
2
7
4
7
3
6
1
10
7
7
3
4
8
5
7
2
10

Figure 6.12: SQL Injection Petri Net Goals Phase
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Table 6.23: SQL Injection Petri Net Goals Phase Places
Place
dP1
dP2
dP3
dP4
dP5
dP6
dP7
dP8
dP9
dP10
dP11
dP12

Description
Goal phase of the attack occurring
Read application data flag
Failed attack
Goal phase failed
Gain privileges flag
Goal decided
Attacker/Defender strategies
Goal successful
Defense has knowledge of system attack
Attacker’s goal blocked
Modify application data flag
Execute unauthorized code flag

Table 6.24: SQL Injection Petri Net Goals Phase Transitions
Transition
dT1
dT2
dT3
dT4
dT5
dT6
dT7
dT8
dT9
dT10
dT11
dT12
dT13
dT14
dT15
dT16

Description
Attacker moves to goal phase
Attacker attempts to read app
Attacker fails to read app data
Attacker tries again
Attacker aborts goal attempt
Attacker attempts to gain privileges
Attack moves to Attacker/Defender strategies
Attacker fails to gain privileges
Attacker succeeds in reaching goal
Defender monitors attack
Defender blocks actively
Defender blocks passively
Attacker fails to modify application data
Attacker fails to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code
Attacker attempts to modify app

Rates
7
6
10
8
7
1
5
5
3
1
4
9
3
8
2
5

The attacker-controlled transitions for the cross-site scripting attack are aT2,
aT5, aT8, bT2, bT5, bT8, bT11, cT2, cT5, cT8, cT11, cT14, dT2, dT6, dT15, and
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dT16. These transitions represent the actions that an attacker can attempt in an
attack.
Similarly, the defender-controlled transitions for the cross-site scripting attack
are: aT12, aT13, aT14, bT15, bT16, bT17, bT18, cT18, cT19, cT20, cT21, cT22,
and dT11. All actions except for dT11 represent the defender attempting to learn
that an attack is occurring. This involves using instrumentation and reporting to
detect anomalous events. The final transition, dT11, represents the defender actively
stopping an attack.
For the spear phishing attack, the attacker controls transitions aT1, bT2, bT3,
bT9, bT10, bT13, bT16, bT19, cT3, cT6, dT2, dT6, dT15, and dT16. The defender
also has controllable transitions, but they are noticeably fewer. Transitions cT9,
cT10, and dT11 are the only defender-controllable transitions. Due to the nature of a
spear phishing attack, the majority of the attempted exploit occurs before a defender
can detect it.
In an SQL injection attack, the attacking player controls transitions aT1, aT2,
aT6, bT2, bT5, bT8, bT11, cT3, cT6, cT9, cT12, dT2, dT6, dT15,and dT16. The
goal sections between the three attacks presented are identical. This is a typical
occurrence because the goals are broad and apply in many situations. The defender
controls transitions aT9, aT11, bT15, bT16, bT17, bT18, cT15, cT16, cT17, cT18,
and dT11. Once again, dT11 represents a defender actively trying to stop an attack.
Some places that were marked in the PNPSC net had an e↵ect on transition
rates. The player would attempt to get these places marked, thereby increasing the
rate of a beneficial transition further in the PNPSC net. Tables 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27
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give the rates and how the marking a↵ect the base rate for CAPEC 63, 163, and 66
respectively.

6.3

Machine Learning in Cyberattack Models
Zakrzewska and Ferragut introduced the concepts of players and strategies.

The construct of players and strategies lends itself to the concept of machine learning,
specifically reinforcement learning. This section will focus on the machine learning
algorithm design.
We explored the idea of learning new strategies for each player. A player’s
strategy defines what action should be taken by that player when in a particular
state based upon the current player’s observable marking. Each player-controlled
transition has a rate that is controlled by the current strategy. When changing the
strategy, we update the functions that change the players’ controlled transitions’ rates
based on the marking that they can observe. Reinforcement learning is used to learn a
player’s strategy, i.e., to learn the rates that each of that player-controlled transitions
should be set to in order to generate the greatest reward over time.
The definition of a player’s strategy

p

in [3] did not specify whether the

mapping was a function or a relation. We treated the mapping as a function, where
a single input has only one output.
The reward function of the machine learning algorithm is split into two parts.
The first part is based on the success of the given actions. If the action causes a
success place to be marked in the Petri net, then the reward is given as 100. If at the
end of the episode, no success place is marked, then a reward of zero points is given.
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Table 6.25: Cross-Site Scripting Rates and Rates Changed by Places Marked
Transition

Name

Rates

Marked Place Rate Change

bT3

Attacker successfully injects
script via parameters

8

aP4+1, aP7+2, aP10+5

bT6

Attacker successfully records
results via proxy tool

9

aP4+1, aP7+2, aP10+5

bT9

Attacker successfully uses
injection script into UI entry
fields

4

aP4+1, aP7+2, aP10+5

bT12

Attacker successfully uses
injection script into resources

5

aP4+1, aP7+2, aP10+5

cT3

Attacker succeeds in loading
victim’s browser with scripts
and send info

1

bP3+5, pB7+1, pB10+6,
pB13+1

cT6

Attacker successfully causes
browser to take command

6

bP3+2, pB7+1, pB10+9,
pB13+3

cT9

Attacker succeeds in loading
victim’s browser with scripts
to perform actions

9

bP3+6, pB7+5, pB10+2,
pB13+7

cT12

Attacker succeeds in loading
victim’s browser with scripts
to execute requests to other
web sites

5

bP3+1, pB7+4, pB10+3,
pB13+4

cT15

Attacker succeeds in loading
victim’s browser with scripts
to expose invalid info to the
user

2

bP3+5, pB7+2, pB10+4,
pB13+6

dT9

Attacker succeeds in reaching
goal

5

cP3+8, cP7+5, cP10+1,
cP13+3, cP16+2

dT10

Defender monitors attack

3

aP13+1, aP14+7, aP15+3,
aP16+1, bP16+2, bP17+2,
bP18+9, bP19+6, cP20+1,
cP21+7, cP22+4, cP23+2
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Table 6.26: Spear Phishing Rates and Rates Changed by Places Marked
Transition

Name

Rate

Marked Place Rate Change

bT4

Attacker able to obtain
domain

7

aP3+2, aP6+4, aP9+8,
aP12+3, aP15+1, aP18+3

bT6

Attacker able to obtain SSL
certificate

1

aP3+1, aP6+1, aP9+7,
aP12+4, aP15+2, aP18+6

bT11

Attacker able to spider

2

aP3+2, aP6+2, aP9+4,
aP12+3, aP15+5, aP18+8

bT14

Attacker able to save copies
of web pages

6

aP3+4, aP6+2, aP9+7,
aP12+3, aP15+4, aP18+1

bT17

Attacker able to create new
web pages

8

aP3+1, aP6+7, aP9+4,
aP12+2, aP15+6, aP18+9

bT20

Attacker able to create
variant of website

7

aP3+1, aP6+2, aP9+4,
aP12+5, aP15+7, aP18+1

cT4

Attacker able to spoof site

4

bP4+1, bP6+3, bP10+7,
bP12+5, bP14+2, bP17+3

cT7

Attacker able to attack via
phishing link

8

bP4+1, bP6+2, bP10+6,
bP12+2, bP14+7, bP17+6

dT9

Attacker succeeds in reaching
goal

3

cP4+7, cP9+7

dT10

Defender monitors attack

10

cP10+8, cP11+8

The reward values were chosen to be large enough to reward success greater than the
penalty described next.
The second part of the reward function is the cost of the actions taken, as
represented by the rate changes made by the player. This cost was previously defined
as or C2 in the definition of PNPSCs. The currently selected transition rate for the
given marking is compared to the previously used transition rate. The di↵erence
between the transition rates is calculated and then divided by the maximum possible
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Table 6.27: SQL Injection Rates and Rates Changed by Places Marked
Transition

Name

Rate

Marked Place Rate Change

bT3

Attacker succeeds in web
browser attack

4

aP5+2, aP8+3

bT6

Attacker succeeds in
debugging tool attack

10

aP5+1, aP8+5

bT9

Attacker succeeds in using
network-level packet injection
tool

10

aP5+1, aP8+1

bT12

Attacker succeeds in using
modified client

7

aP5+7, aP8+7

cT4

Attacker succeeds in using
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet

4

pB3+2, pB7+1, pB10+3,
pB13+3

cT7

Attacker succeeds in adding
logic to query

6

pB3+1, pB7+1, pB10+2,
pB13+5

cT10

Attacker succeeds in using
Blind SQL Injection
techniques

7

pB3+4, pB7+1, pB10+4,
pB13+1

cT13

Attacker succeeds in stacking
queries: (DOS)

4

pB3+7, pB7+2, pB10+6,
pB13+1

dT9

Attacker succeeds in reaching
goal

3

cP4+5, cP8+7, cP11+3,
cP14+6

dT10

Defender monitors attack

1

aP10+3, aP12+1, bP16+2,
bP17+5, bP18+9, bP19+5,
cP16+7, cP17+1, cP18+4,
cP19+8
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di↵erence. This is multiplied by the success rate and then subtracted from the success
rate. This allows for a scaled penalty. If there is no change in transition rates, then
the maximum reward is given. If the maximum di↵erence is chosen, then the reward
of zero is given for a success.
To determine the optimal policy and select the best rate over time, each set of
rates is tried at least once. Then using an e-Greedy method as described in [4], the
process either chooses the rate with the highest average reward so far (probability
1 e) or selects a random rate in order to search for a better strategy (probability
e). The former is referred to as exploitation and the latter as exploration. This
could continue indefinitely, but we stop at 500,000 episodes. An episode is a single
cyberattack that is simulated to completion. The simulation ends whenever a success
place of the Petri net is marked or whenever there is no longer at least one transition
that is able to fire. The success place for the attacker represents that the attacker
has achieved his or her goals. The success place for the defender represents that
the defender has successfully stopped the attacker from reaching the attacker success
place. In Figures 6.4, 6.8 and 6.12, place dP8 is the attacker’s success place and
place dP10 is the defender’s success place. Once an episode reaches completion, the
reward is calculated as described previously. Each player-observable marking has
associated with it a list of transition rates that have been attempted. The reward
for a rate associated with a player-observable marking is a running average of the
rewards received for that given rate. A reward is only assigned to a player-observable
marking that was visited with the rate that was chosen for the current episode. This
methodology is described in [4].
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The final key element is selection of a value for e for the e-Greedy solution.
Four di↵erent values were selected, 0, 0.01, 0.02, and 0.04. The higher the value, the
greater the chance for exploration.
Each set of rates was seeded with an initial reward value of 1,000, thereby
forcing each rate to be exploited at least once. After that, the chosen rate is the one
with the highest average reward, unless exploring occurs. The pseudocode code given
in Figures 6.13 and 6.14, based on [4], show how the rewards and costs are calculated.
The defender was allowed to set rates during each phase of the attack. This
was done to allow the defender to learn a reasonable set of rates during an attack.
The only time the defender is given a positive reward is when the defender chooses to
block the attack while place dP9 is marked. All other times, the attacker is assumed
to have failed to get to the point where the defender is able to perform an action. We
did not count the attacker’s lack of ability as a success for the defender.

6.4

Results
Although the simulation was run 500,000 episodes for each case, the majority

of learning occurred in the first 100,000 episodes. Therefore, all resulting figures only
highlight the first 100,000 episodes.
For the cross-site scripting attack, the average reward has a positive trend as
shown in Figure 6.15. The average reward shown in Figure 6.15 is a running average
based on the reward given at the end of each episode in which place aP2 was at
one time marked. This player-observable marking was chosen since it will always
be marked at some point during the execution of the cyberattack simulation. The
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Initialization
for transitions rate a = 1 to k : do
R(a)
100 ;
N (a)
0;
P reviousRate
(0, 0, 0, 0) based on the number of transitions ;
end
Main;
repeat
(
maxR(a),
with probability 1 - e,
f (x) =
;
RandomRate, with probability e.
Rate
f (x) ;
Reward
Success(Rate) Cost(Rate, P reviousRate);
P reviousRate
Rate;
N (a)
N (a) + 1;
R(a)
R(a) + N 1(a) ⇤ [Reward R(a)];
until forever ;
Where R(a) is the reward for Rate a and N (a) is the number of visits to
Rate a
Figure 6.13: Code Sample for Calculating the Reward
(

100, if player reaches a success place,
;
0,
if the player reaches a fail place.
Success(Rate)
f (x);
Cost(Rate, P reviousRate)
Success(Rate) Dif f erence(Rate, P reviousRate) ⇤ NT100
;
⇤NR
Where NT is the number of transitions and NR is the number of rates
f (x) =

Figure 6.14: Code Sample to Calculating Cost

positive trend implies that the machine learning algorithm is finding or improving the
attacker’s strategy so as to increase the likelihood of achieving the player’s objective.
The attacker’s player-observable marking of place aP2 has an average reward of 28.54.
This reward is the average reward from all episodes in which aP2 was marked at least
once regardless of the set of transition rates that was selected. A sample strategy
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that was generated is provided in Table 6.28. The average given in the table is based
on the average reward for the rate chosen in which the marking was visited at least
once during the episode. The rates shown in the table give the maximum reward for
the given marking. When the player is in a given marking, he or she would select the
set of rates that correspond to that player-observable marking. Figure 6.15(a) is the
overview of the average reward over 100,000 episodes. Figure 6.15(b) is a zoomed in
portion of Figure 6.15(a). Figure 6.16—Figure 6.18 are formatted similarly.
The results from the defender-controlled transitions are shown in Figure 6.16.
As can be seen, a similar increasing average reward trend is observed. A sample of the
strategies that are generated is given in Table 6.29. The defender observable places
dPDefenderA, dPDefenderB, dPDefenderC, and dPDefenderD are synonymous with
aP1, bP1, cP1, and dP1. These names are used for analytical clarity. When starting
the defense, the best option is to activate aT13 and aT14. This leads to an average
reward of 7.52. This is without the benefit of including the attacker’s inability to
succeed in the defender’s reward.
Both the attacker and defender results were generated with static opponents.
An interesting result occurs, when the players are allowed to dynamically compete
against one another. The attacker and defender’s average reward is shown in Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18 respectively. The attacker’s average reward drops to 21.54
while the defender’s average reward rises to 9.53.
The spear phishing attack has an average reward of 30.89 when using an e of
0.02 and is shown in Figure 6.19. Using an e value greater than zero shows that a
better strategy can be found by exploring. The defender has an average reward of
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Table 6.28: Sample Strategy for Cross-Site Scripting Attacker Determined by the
Maximum Average Reward
Average
28.54
48.26

Marking
(aP2)
(aP10, bP1)

46.05182794

(aP7, bP1)

60.59

(aP10, bP7, cP1)

46.58163965

(aP4, bP1)

61.48

(aP10, bP10, cP1)

57.74

(aP10, bP3, cP1)

59.64

(aP10, bP13, cP1)

58.48

(aP4, bP7, cP1)

75.35

(aP10, bP7, cP7, dP1)

Rates
(aT2 = 10, aT5 = 10, aT8 = 10)
(bT2 = 10, bT5 = 10, bT8 = 10, bT11 =
10)
(bT2 = 10, bT5 = 10, bT8 = 10, bT11 =
10)
(cT2 = 10, cT5 = 10, cT8 = 10, cT11 = 0,
cT14 = 10)
(bT2 = 10, bT5 = 10, bT8 = 10, bT11 =
10)
(cT2 = 10, cT5 = 10, cT8 = 10, cT11 = 0,
cT14 = 10)
(cT2 = 10, cT5 = 10, cT8 = 0, cT11 = 0,
cT14 = 0)
(cT2 = 10, cT5 = 10, cT8 = 10, cT11 = 0,
cT14 = 10)
(cT2 = 10, cT5 = 10, cT8 = 10, cT11 = 0,
cT14 = 0)
(dT2 = 0, dT6 = 10, dT15 = 10, dT16 =
0)

29.06 from their starting state in the exploit phase C from Figure 6.7. This phase is
the first phase that a defender can perform an action. Figure 6.20 shows the average
reward for the defender over 100,000 episodes. Samples of strategies for the attacker
and defender are provided in Table 6.30 and Table 6.31 respectively. Figure 6.19(a)
is the overview of the average reward over 100,000 episodes for spear phishing. Figure 6.19(b) is a zoomed in portion of Figure 6.19(a). Figure 6.20—Figure 6.22 are
formatted similarly.
The results of allowing dynamic players are just as interesting in spear phishing. The attacker’s average reward decreased slightly to an average of 28.04. The
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Table 6.29: Sample Strategy for Cross-Site Scripting Defender Determined by the
Maximum Average Reward
Average
7.52
22.03

Marking
(dPDefenderA)
(dPDefenderB)

31.34

(dPDefenderC)

46.03
24.13

(dPDefenderD)
(aP16, dPDefenderB)

34.99

(aP16, dPDefenderC)

37.33

(bP18, dPDefenderC)

72.5

(aP16, bP19, dPDefenderC)

50

(aP16, bP16, dPDefenderC)

20

(aP14, aP15, dPDefenderC)

Rates
(aT12 = 0, aT13 = 10, aT14 = 10)
(bT15 = 0, bT16 = 0, bT17 = 10, bT18
= 0)
(cT18 = 10, cT19 = 0, cT20 = 0, cT21
= 0, cT22 = 0)
(dT11 = 10)
(bT15 = 0, bT16 = 10, bT17 = 0, bT18
= 0)
(cT18 = 10, cT19 = 0, cT20 = 0, cT21
= 0, cT22 = 0)
(cT18 = 10, cT19 = 0, cT20 = 0, cT21
= 0, cT22 = 0)
(cT18 = 10, cT19 = 10, cT20 = 10, cT21
= 0, cT22 = 0)
(cT18 = 10, cT19 = 0, cT20 = 0, cT21
= 10, cT22 = 10)
(cT18 = 0, cT19 = 10, cT20 = 0, cT21
= 0, cT22 = 10)

defender’s average reward had a greater decrease to 21.67. This is due to the attacker having set rates higher than the static rates given in Table 6.10, Table 6.12,
Table 6.14, and Table 6.16. The average reward for the attacker and defender is given
in Figure 6.21 and Figure 6.22 respectively.
The SQL injection attack has an average reward of 31.35 when using an e
of 0.02 and is shown in Figure 6.23. The defender has an average reward of 38.61
from their starting state in the explore phase A from Figure 6.9. Figure 6.24 shows
the average reward for the defender over 100,000 episodes. Samples of strategies for
the attacker and defender are provided in Table 6.32 and Table 6.33 respectively.
Figure 6.23(a) is the overview of the average reward over 100,000 episodes for spear
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Table 6.30: Sample Strategy for Spear Phishing Attacker Determined by the Maximum Average Reward
Average
30.89
34.35

Marking
(aP1)
(aP4, aP10, aP16, bP1)

26.46

(bP1)

24.63

(cP1)

38.72

(aP4, aP10, bP4, bP6, bP12, bP17, cP1)

92.31

(aP4, aP7, aP13, aP16, bP4, bP6, bP17, cP4, dP1)

91.67

(aP4, aP10, aP16, aP19, bP10, bP17, cP4, dP1)

Rates
(aT1 = 10)
(bT2 = 0, bT3
= 10, bT9 = 10,
bT10 = 0, bT13
= 0, bT16 = 10,
bT19 = 0)
(bT2 = 0, bT3
= 10, bT9 =
10, bT10 =
10, bT13 =
10, bT16 = 10,
bT19 = 10)
(cT3 = 10, cT6
= 10)
(cT3 = 10, cT6
= 0)
(dT2 = 10, dT6
= 0, dT15 = 0,
dT16 = 10)
(dT2 = 10, dT6
= 10, dT15 = 0,
dT16 = 0)

phishing. Figure 6.23(b) is a zoomed in portion of Figure 6.23(a). Figure 6.24 —Figure 6.26 are formatted similarly.
The results of allowing dynamic players are also interesting in SQL injection.
The attacker’s average reward increased slightly to an average of 32.09. The defender’s
average reward had a decrease to 37.91. The average reward for the attacker and
defender is given in Figure 6.21 and Figure 6.22 respectively.
There is a balancing act that must occur between exploration and exploitation
when using the e-Greedy selection method. Too much exploration incurs the cost of
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Table 6.31: Sample Strategy for Spear Phishing Defender Determined by the Maximum Average Reward
Average
29.06
60.43
73.58
66.37
73.29
73.52

Marking
(dPDefenderC)
(dPDefenderD)
(cP11, dP9, dPDefenderD)
(cP10, dPDefenderD)
(cP10, dP9, dPDefenderD)
(dP9, dPDefenderD)

Rates
(cT9 = 10, cT10 = 10)
(dT11 = 10)
(dT11 = 10)
(dT11 = 10)
(dT11 = 10)
(dT11 = 10)

Table 6.32: Sample Strategy for SQL Injection Attacker Determined by the Maximum Average Reward
Average
31.34969437
28.44550067

Marking
(aP3)
(aP8, bP1)

20.48858205

(aP5, bP1)

44.12293241
43.76280549
23.49206349
33.8083273
47.95387693

(bP10, cP1)
(bP7, cP1)
(aP8, bP3, cP1)
(aP8, bP13, cP1)
(aP8, bP13, cP4, dP1)

44.61038961

(aP5, bP7, cP8, dP1)

40.54545455

(bP7, cP8, dP1)

Rates
(aT2 = 0, aT6 = 10)
(bT2 = 10, bT5 = 0, bT8 = 10, bT11 =
10)
(bT2 = 0, bT5 = 10, bT8 = 10, bT11 =
10)
(cT3 = 0, cT6 = 10, cT9 = 10, cT12 = 10)
(cT3 = 0, cT6 = 10, cT9 = 10, cT12 = 10)
(cT3 = 10, cT6 = 0, cT9 = 10, cT12 = 10)
(cT3 = 10, cT6 = 0, cT9 = 10, cT12 = 10)
(dT2 = 10, dT6 = 0, dT15 = 10, dT16 =
10)
(dT2 = 0, dT6 = 0, dT15 = 10, dT16 =
10)
(dT2 = 10, dT6 = 10, dT15 = 10, dT16 =
10)

changing transitions. A completely greedy selection method may never discover the
true optimal action to take in a given state. A better approach may be to weight
the reward based on the episode that it was determined. The idea is to begin the
experiment with more exploration and end with more exploitation.
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Table 6.33: Sample Strategy for SQL Injection Defender Determined by the Maximum Average Reward
Average
38.61246075
38.80493021

Marking
(dPDefenderA)
(dPDefenderB)

45.82779419

(dPDefenderC)

58.5418121
41.41704509

(dPDefenderD)
(aP10, dPDefenderB)

39.9535083

(aP12, dPDefenderB)

31.34420945

(aP12, bP16, dPDefenderB)

38.32246205

(aP12, bP16, dPDefenderC)

51.82486395

(aP12, cP16, dPDefenderC)

36.59652333

(cP16, cP19, dPDefenderC)

Rates
(aT9 = 10, aT11 = 10)
(bT15 = 10, bT16 = 0, bT17 =
bT18 = 0)
(cT15 = 10, cT16 = 0, cT17 =
cT18 = 0)
(dT11 = 10)
(bT15 = 0, bT16 = 10, bT17 =
bT18 = 0)
(bT15 = 10, bT16 = 0, bT17 =
bT18 = 0)
(bT15 = 10, bT16 = 10, bT17 =
bT18 = 0)
(cT15 = 10, cT16 = 10, cT17 =
cT18 = 0)
(cT15 = 10, cT16 = 0, cT17 =
cT18 = 0)
(cT15 = 10, cT16 = 10, cT17 =
cT18 = 10)

0,
0,

0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,

The second interesting result is that several of the transitions are deactivated,
versus being activated to allow the player an attempt to perform the action. This
implies that it is better to not attempt to attack or defend in certain scenarios. In
reality, both the attacker and defender must determine if the real-world value of their
goal (penetrating or defending the computer system) exceeds the real-world costs of
the actions taken to achieve that goal.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.15: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Cross-Site Scripting
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.16: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Cross-Site Scripting
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.17: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Cross-Site Scripting with Dynamic Defender
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.18: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Cross-Site Scripting with Dynamic Attacker
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.19: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Spear Phishing
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.20: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Spear Phishing
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.21: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Spear Phishing
with Dynamic Defender
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.22: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for Spear Phishing
with Dynamic Attacker
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.23: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for SQL Injection
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.24: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for SQL Injection
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.25: Attacker Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for SQL Injection
with Dynamic Defender
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.26: Defender Average Reward Over 100,000 Episodes for SQL Injection
with Dynamic Attacker

148

6.5

Robustness
As described in the previous sections, the attacker and defender each competed

against a static rival. Only one player would learn the optimal strategy by changing
the rates under its control, as previously described. The opposing players would
not ever change the rates that they controlled. This section details what happens
when both players can compete against each other. Each player would perform an
episode of the simulation, while changing the rates and updating the strategies under
the player’s control. The opposing player would then do the same, using the other
player’s rates that were previously used. This process repeats itself until both players
have performed 500,000 episodes of the simulation.
For CAPEC 63, Cross-Site Scripting, three complete experiments were performed. The results are given in Figure 6.27 and Figure 6.28. The first was with a
static player, named Static Players, where neither attacker nor defender change any
rates. The second is with a dynamic player that learned new strategies while the
opposing player remained static, named 1 Dynamic Player. The final experiment was
with both players learning new strategies and competing against each other, named
2 Dynamic Players. Figure 6.27 is from the attacker’s point of view and Figure 6.28
is from the defender’s point of view. Because the Static Players did not change rates,
all results are presented as percentage of success. This allowed for fair comparison
between the Static Players, 1 Dynamic Player, and 2 Dynamic Players. For this
research, the dynamic player could only choose between zero and ten. The static
players were randomly assigned transition rates ranging between one and ten.
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Figure 6.27: Cross-Site Scripting Attacker Robustness

Figure 6.28: Cross-Site Scripting Defender Robustness

Similarly, for CAPEC 66, SQL Injection, another three experiments were performed. The results from Figure 6.29 are from the attacker’s point of view and likewise
Figure 6.30 is from the defender’s point of view.
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Figure 6.29: SQL Injection Attacker Robustness

Figure 6.30: SQL Injection Defender Robustness
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Figure 6.31: Spear Phishing Attacker Robustness

Figure 6.32: Spear Phishing Defender Robustness
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In Figures 6.31 and 6.32, the results from CAPEC 163, Spear Phishing, are
given. The attacker’s point of view is given in Figure 6.31 while the defender’s point
of view is given in Figure 6.32.
These results highlight the first 100,000 episodes of the 500,000 episode experiments. It is in these sections that the interesting learning occurs.
Table 6.34 compares the results from the attacking player, while Table 6.35
compares the results from the defending player. The percent change is a comparison
between the 2 dynamic players and the 1 dynamic player. A positive percent change
indicates that the 2 dynamic players performed better than just a single dynamic
player. A negative percent change means that the single dynamic player performed
better.

Table 6.34: Attacker Robustness
Attacker

Static

1-Dynamic
Player

2-Dynamic
Players

Percent
Change

Cross-Site
Scripting

22.39

21.66

27.15

25.35%

SQL Injection

35.74

37.41

37.27

-0.37%

Spear
Phishing

19.53

26.59

29.12

9.51%

As expected, each player attempts to minimize their losses over time. The
result of the static players performing better than one or the other dynamic players
implies that multiple player controlled rate choices should be available.
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Table 6.35: Defender Robustness
Defender

Static

1-Dynamic
Player

2-Dynamic
Players

Percent
Change

Cross-Site
Scripting

12.91

12.96

9.36

-0.37%

SQL Injection

42.21

43.79

37.88

-13.5%

Spear
Phishing

24.47

23.00

29.11

25.35%

6.6

Summary
The results of the reinforcement learning algorithm clearly answer the research

questions presented earlier. We have shown how to map the features of a Petri net
to the reinforcement framework from [4]. The agent is the player and the action that
the player can take is to change the transition rates. The reward is calculated by
whether or not the player reached a success or failure place at the end of the episode.
The state is the marking of the places. The environment is the Petri net itself. The
reward is based on the final end state. All intermediate states are updated based on
the final reward.
The second question was answered by implementing the Petri net simulator
and the machine learning algorithm. The results from the experiments show that the
attacker and defender can both learn by varying their policies, or transition rates.
The e-Greedy solution allows for exploitation and exploration to determine the best
set of transitions rates. Players can compete against one another to maximize their
potential success while at the same time minimizing the impact of the other player.
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This chapter also identified the degree to which strategies were impacted when
players competed against each other. The results suggest that allowing players more
than two rates to choose from could have a greater impact on the success of each
player. The biggest limiting factor at this time was computer memory. Future research should focus on minimizing memory usage and maximizing the number of rates
to choose from.
The techniques presented here can enable informed decision making by computer system managers and operators. Persons responsible for defending a computer
system can benefit from knowledge of vulnerabilities in their systems and the relative
likelihood of them being exploited found by the machine learning process. Persons
responsible for attacking a computer system can use machine learning to plan their
attacks. The methods can be customized to specific computer systems by adjusting
the success and cost reward values and the allowable transition rates. Models of additional CAPEC attack patterns can be developed using the PNPSC formalism, and
those models can be composed into more complete models of a specific system [75].
Finally, the PNPSC formalism can be used to model non-CAPEC attacks as well.
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CHAPTER 7

DESIGN DECISIONS AND GENERALIZED ANALYSIS PROCESS

7.1

Introduction
From the previous chapter we can see that the reinforcement learning algo-

rithm is making choices to improve the reward over time. There are two experiments
that are described in this chapter that are based on the previous results. The first
experiment shows how an analyst and decision maker can trace the likely path than
attacker will follow using the strategies learned. The analyst can then implement an
intrusion detection system to a↵ect the average reward and compare the results to
the original PNPSC net.
The second experiment follows a similar process to the first to determine the
likely path of an attack. The strategies learned show the decisions that an attacker
should take at each phase. A decision maker can focus resources to improve the
appropriate skills. These improvements are tested to show an immediate impact.
The final section details the general process for an analyst to perform for any
PNPSC net. This process interprets the results for resourcing decisions to be made.
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Table 7.1: Optimal Defender Strategies for Cross-Site Scripting Design
Average

Visits

Marking

Rate

69.23

1569

(aP16, bP17, dP9,
dPDefenderD)

(dT11=10)

37.39

4739

(aP16, bP17, dPDefenderC)

(cT18=10, cT19=0,
cT20=10, cT21=10, cT22=0)

24.13

32311

(aP16, dPDefenderB)

(bT15=0, bT16=10, bT17=0,
bT18=0)

7.52

491413

(dPDefenderA,)

(aT12=0, aT13=10,
aT14=10)

7.2

Making Design Decisions
This research has shown that a reinforcement learning algorithm can be imple-

mented to determine optimal strategies for an attacker or defender. These strategies
can be used to make design decisions to make better use of resources available. Two
examples are presented in this section.
For the first example, CAPEC 63 was explored from the defender’s point
of view. The strategies were chosen from the results with a value of e-0.02. The
first choice to make is select the value that gives the highest average reward with a
sufficiently large number of visits for place dPDefender. The number of visits is an
important factor because if a marking is only visited a few times, it may not represent
the expected reward for that particular marking. As shown in Table 7.1, the highest
average reward with a sufficiently large number of visits is for the marking (aP16,
bP17, dP9, dPDefenderD) with an average reward of 69.23.
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Figure 7.1: Defender Results with an Intrusion Detection System

The next step is to determine which set of rates from dPDefenderC is required to get to the previous marking. In this case, the marking is (aP16, bP17,
dPDefenderC). You repeat this process until you finally arrive at your initial marking
of dPDefenderA with the rates given.
At this point is where the designer must make a decision. If one was going
to implement an intrusion detection system (IDS), at which point does it make the
most sense? Using this learned strategy, it was determined that placing an IDS at
aT14 makes the most impact. This makes sense based on the rates of the attacker’s
static transitions. The attacker chooses to attempt aT9 with a rate of 5, where they
attempt aT6 with a rate of 2. By defending at aT14, you stop an attack more often
than if you block at aT12. The results are shown in Figure 7.1 and the average reward
given in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Results of Cross-Site Scripting Design Strategies
Design
Original
IDS at aT14
IDS at aT12
IDS at aT14 and aT12

Results
8.947
16.542
9.057
16.471

Each phase of CAPEC 63 is given in Figure 7.2 – Figure 7.5. Figure 7.2 is the
explore phase. Figure 7.3 is the experiment phase. Figure 7.4 is the exploit phase
and Figure 7.5 is the goal phase. The figures are marked with the typical path the
attacker would take. Places are highlighted with red for an attacker marked place
and blue for a defender marked place. Additionally, the rates used by the defender as
provided in Table 7.1 are given for each figure. The non-player-controlled rates are
shown in black for the transitions that when fired, advance the attacking player to
the next phase. The complete list of rates is provided in Tables 6.2, 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8.
As can be seen, the optimal solution that was discovered by the reinforcement
learning algorithm chooses defender rates that attempt to detect the most likely of
attacker actions. This is intuitive because even though all options are available, some
will be chosen more often than others. It makes the most sense to apply resources to
the most likely path that an attacker will take.
For the second example, CAPEC 163 was examined from the attacker’s point
of view. Following the same process as previously described, the strategy given in
Table 7.3 was used to make decisions. The rate to use for the first phase was trivial
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Figure 7.2: Cross-Site Scripting Explore Phase with Attack Path

Figure 7.3: Cross-Site Scripting Experiment Phase with Attack path
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Figure 7.4: Cross-Site Scripting Exploit Phase with Attack Path

Table 7.3: Optimal Attacker Strategies for Spear Phishing Design
Average

Visits

Marking

Rate

66.55

3253

(aP4, aP7, aP10, bP4, bP6,
bP10, bP17, cP4, dP1)

(dT2=10, dT6=0, dT15=0,
dT16=0)

38.18

6608

(aP4, aP7, aP10, bP4, bP6,
bP10, bP17, cP1)

(cT3=10, cT6=0)

33.39

53648

(aP4, aP7, aP10, bP1)

(bT2=0, bT3=10, bT9=0,
bT10=10, bT13=0, bT16=0,
bT19=10)

19.29

500000

(aP1)

(aT1=10)

because there is only one attacker-controlled transition. For variety, the e used for
this example was e-0.04.
The hypothetical decision for this example is for the attacker to choose to
increase their abilities, which increases success. This was modeled by increasing the
rate of dT9, the attacker is successful, based on the marking of the net. In the base
model, dT9 has a standard rate of 3. If place cP4 was marked, then an dT9 went
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Figure 7.5: Cross-Site Scripting Goals Phase with Attack Path

Table 7.4: Results of Spear Phishing Scripting Design Strategies
Design
Original
Increase Success

Results
19.293
21.192

from a rate of 3 to a rate of 10. With the attacker increasing his or her skill, this rate
was increased to 20 when cP4 was marked. The results are show in Figure 7.6 and
the average reward is given in Table 7.4.
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Figure 7.6: Attacker Results with Increasing Attacker’s Skillset

Similarly to the previous example, Figure 7.7 – Figure 7.10 show the phases of
CAPEC 163. The figures are marked with the typical path the attacker would take.
Places are highlighted with red for an attacker marked place. Additionally, the rates
used by the attacker as provided in Table 7.4 are given for each figure. The complete
list of rates is provided in Tables 6.10, 6.12, 6.14 and 6.16.
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Figure 7.7: Spear Phishing Explore Phase with Attack Path
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Figure 7.8: Spear Phishing Experiment Phase with Attack Path
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Figure 7.9: Spear Phishing Exploit Phase with Attack Path

166

Figure 7.10: Spear Phishing Goals Phase with Attack Path

As can be seen, the optimal solution that was discovered by the reinforcement
learning algorithm chooses attacker rates that attempt to avoid the higher defender
detection transitions. It makes sense to apply resources that attempt to minimize
detection by the defender.
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7.3

Generalized Analysis Process
This chapter has shown how the machine learning algorithm can be applied

to make design decisions by either an attacker or defender for the PNPSC nets that
were presented. The process can be adapted in a generalized manner to any PNPSC
net. This section will describe this generalized process.
The first step is to develop the PNPSC net. The net should accurately reflect
the system that one is trying to model from both the attacker and defender’s perspective. Accurate rates should be assigned to reflect the capabilities of the attacker and
defender. Estimated rates that are validated by subject matter experts can be used.
The net design is a critical component because if it is not implemented correctly, then
the results cannot be considered legitimate.
The second step is to run the machine learning algorithm against the PNPSC
net. Multiple executions should be used with various epsilon values to ensure that
an optimal strategy is found. The strategies can be graphed to visually confirm that
one value of e is superior to another.
The third step is to compare the results and choose the highest average reward
from the e used previously. The highest average reward will result in the highest
success rate over many iterations. Using this highest average reward, examine the
strategies that were produced.
The next step that follows is to build the likely path of success from the
strategies generated. The first strategy to consider is the one that generates the
highest average reward that was visited a sufficiently large amount of times (typically
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in the thousands). This strategy should include the final input place, dP1. This will
determine the rates for the goals phase along with the markings from the previous
phases that produced this rate. Then the analyst works backwards to the exploit
phase to determine the strategies that produced the highest reward with a sufficient
number of visits that contains the markings from the explore and experiment phases.
This determines the rates to be used for the player-controlled transitions in the exploit
phase. This process continues for the experiment phase and then finally for the explore
phase.
Following that step, the analyst decides where to add the capabilities that he
or she desires to test. For example, the defender may choose to add an intrusion
detection system. The analyst examines the PNPSC net with the path marked out
and implements the changes.
Tests are conducted and results compared against the original designed PNPSC
net. These tests will either confirm or refute the design choice considered. The design
can then be finalized and implemented in a tangible manner. These changes can be
evaluated in regular intervals to respond to the ever-changing nature of cyberattacks.

7.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter focused on two di↵erent experiments. The first was using the

strategies learned from the reinforcement algorithm to determine an ideal location to
implement an intrusion detection system. This improvement immediately blocked an
attack, once it was detected. The path that the attacker would take along with the
defender optimal rates was given as well.
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The second experiment identified areas that managers could assign resources
in order to improve the success rate of the attacker. This improvement translated
directly into a higher rate for the transition that led to the success place of the
attacker. The typical path for the attacker with the optimal rates was also given.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

8.1

Summary of Chapters
The chapters presented represent the breadth and depth of work for this re-

search project. Chapter 1 was a brief introduction to machine learning as well as
Petri nets. The research questions were posed in this chapter as well.
Chapter 2 is a sampled survey of relevant literature for background purposes.
The survey covered cybersecurity in Petri nets, machine learning Petri nets, other
techniques to model cybersecurity, and other uses of Petri nets.
The overview of all the ongoing research projects is given in Chapter 3. This
chapter details the four interconnect projects. Additionally, it provides a detailed
introduction to Petri nets and to the Zakrzewska PNPS formalism.
The details of the new Petri net with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC)
formalism is provided in Chapter 4. Inhibitor arcs are added, along with two di↵erent
cost functions. This chapter also walks through a detailed example of how cost
analysis can be performed.
The validity of the Petri nets is proven in Chapter 5. The details of how
the Petri nets were chosen, built, and validated with structured face validation are
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provided in this chapter. The results confirmed that the models used for the machine
learning portion of this research are of sufficient quality to be useful. More work
remains to increase the quality of techniques used, but that is saved for a future
e↵ort.
Chapter 6 describes the machine learning portion of this research. In it, the
algorithm is described and its implementation detailed. The algorithm is executed
and results are presented highlighting its e↵ectiveness. An attacker learns a strategy
based on a static defender. Then the defender learns with a static attacker. Finally,
both attacker and defender are allowed to learn after each of their respective episodes.
The robustness of each player’s strategy is explored in detail.
In Chapter 7, two experiments were performed to showcase the decisions that
a manager could make to influence an attacker or defender’s ability to succeed. The
process was then generalized and detailed from the perspective of an analyst trying
to interpret the results of the algorithm and the strategies that were generated.

8.2

Research Questions Answered
The techniques presented here allow for decision makers to have the knowledge

to make an informed choice. They no longer have to guess at what is a likely weakness
in their architectures. They can add costs to be more realistic for their environment.
Designers are not limited to CAPEC entries. They can use any method of their choice
to model a system using the Petri net with Players, Strategies, and Cost formalism.
The research questions that were presented in Chapter 1 were answered in the
previous chapters. Each question is answered definitively below.
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Can the features of a Petri net model be mapped to the framework of a reinforcement learning algorithm? We have shown in Chapter 6 that we can map the
features of a Petri net to the reinforcement framework from [4]. The agent is the
player that is learning, either the attacker or defender, and the environment is the
PNPSC. The action that the learning player can take is to update his controllable
firing rates. The PNPSC would respond by changing the marking of the Petri net,
or state. The reward would be based on the successful execution of the PNPSC
from the player’s point of view. For example, the reward is positive for an attacker if
the attack reaches a compromised state. It is negative for the attacker if the attack
is blocked by the defender or is unsuccessful. The opposite would be true for the
defender.
Can the reinforcement learning algorithm be implemented in a Petri net simulator in order to learn cyberattack and defense strategies? In Chapter 6, the reinforcement learning algorithm was implemented into a simulator and executed. The results
from the experiments show that the attacker and defender can both learn by varying
their policies, or transition rates. The e-Greedy solution allows for exploitation and
exploration to determine the best set of transitions rates.
How robust are cyberattack and defense strategies produced by reinforcement
learning? Players were shown in Chapter 6 that they can compete against one another
to maximize their potential success while at the same time minimizing the impact of
the other player. Each player updated their respective strategies after they completed
an episode. The results showed that each player was able to minimize the impact of
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changing strategies. Each player found the optimal policy for each state, or marking,
that they were in at any given time.
Can a function be developed to estimate the likely cost of an attacker or defender changing transitions rates? The PNPSC formalism, as detailed in Chapter
4, provides two cost functions. The first function added a generalized cost to the
firing of a transition. The second, and one used for this research, used the di↵erence
between rates that the player changed. This is why the rewards in Chapter 6 started
negative and moved toward positive rewards.

8.3

Future Works
While performing this research, several opportunities for potential future works

were identified.
• Implementing the Petri nets as an Intrusion Detection System using Model
Based System Engineering tools (MBSE).
• Identifying accurate rates for attacker/defender skills for simulation improvement.
• Developing Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) metrics to identify times until failure, detection, etc.
• Implementing other reinforcement learning techniques, such as dynamic programming or temporal di↵erence algorithms in a novel way with the PNPSC
formalism.
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• Implement multiple rates for a player to attempt to learn with instead of just
zero or ten.
This list is not exhaustive, but rather a starting point to further explore.

8.4

Final Thoughts
This research has shown how cyberattacks can be modeled with Petri nets

and learning algorithms applied to create strategies. Creating these Petri nets is
nontrivial and time consuming. Each net that was developed took on average 6+
months with multiple iterations required. While it was time intensive, it was worth
the e↵ort. Decision makers can now make informed decisions and choose the best
defensive measures that are within their budgets. Options such as updating their
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to defend against cyberattacks are able
to be clearly defined. A defender does not need to just “disconnect from the internet.”
Rather, they can selectively choose the best course of action in a given environment.
This research will hopefully be the beginning of new and novel methods of
modeling and simulating cyberattacks.
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APPENDIX A

VALIDATION EFFORT SUBJECT MATTER RESPONSE TABLES

Table A.1: Subject Matter Expert Education Level
What is your maximum education level?
High School
Some College
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Beyond Bachelor’s Degree

Count of Response

7
7

Table A.2: Subject Matter Expert CAPEC Familiarity
Are you familiar with the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
database?
Not at all familiar
Not so familiar
Somewhat familiar
Very familiar
Extremely familiar
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Count of Response

4
6
4

Table A.3: Subject Matter Expert Petri Net Familiarity
Are you familiar with Petri Nets and their use?
Not at all familiar
Not so familiar
Somewhat familiar
Very familiar
Extremely familiar

Count of Response
4
4
5
1

Table A.4: Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Involvement
Are you involved with cybersecurity?
Not at all
Not professional, part time hobby
Not professional, full time hobby
Professional, part time
Professional, full time

Count of Response
1

13

Table A.5: Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Activity Level
How often do you engage in cybersecurity activities?
Less than once a month
Once a month
A few times a month
About once a week
A few times a week
Every day
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Count of Response
1

4
9

Table A.6: CAPEC 63 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC 63 – CROSS SITE
SCRIPTING (XSS) attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0005

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual
point of view.

Reject H0

0.0005

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for
actions that an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0005

The Defender places and transitions make sense for
actions that a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0033

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0033

Attacker places/transition accurately represent
things an attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0005

Defender places/transitions accurately represent
things a defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Petri Net as whole accurately represent things
that occur during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0174

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0174

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of
the attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect
the costs for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in
a correct enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0033
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Table A.7: CAPEC 66 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC 66 – SQL Injection
attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0003

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual
point of view.

Reject H0

0.0003

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for
actions that an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0003

The Defender places and transitions make sense for
actions that a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0003

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0019

Attacker places/transition accurately represent
things an attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0019

Defender places/transitions accurately represent
things a defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0019

The Petri Net as whole accurately represent things
that occur during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0105

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0105

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0019

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0416

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of
the attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.2819

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect
the costs for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.8759

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in
a correct enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0105

179

Table A.8: CAPEC 163 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC 163 – Spear Phishing
attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0002

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual
point of view.

Reject H0

0.0002

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for
actions that an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0063

The Defender places and transitions make sense for
actions that a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0011

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0011

Attacker places/transition accurately represent
things an attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0261

Defender places/transitions accurately represent
things a defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0011

The Petri Net as whole accurately represent things
that occur during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0261

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.0828

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0011

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0261

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of
the attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect
the costs for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in
a correct enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0063
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Table A.9: CAPEC 169 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC 169 – Footprinting
attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0005

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual
point of view.

Reject H0

0.0174

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for
actions that an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Defender places and transitions make sense for
actions that a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0005

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0033

Attacker places/transition accurately represent
things an attacker can do.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

Defender places/transitions accurately represent
things a defender can do.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The Petri Net as whole accurately represent things
that occur during the given cybersecurity attack.

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.3815

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0174

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of
the attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect
the costs for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in
a correct enough way to be useful for research.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658
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cyber attacks with Petri nets. Entropy, 16(12):6602–6623, 2014.
[24] Hasan Cam, Pierre Mouallem, Yilin Mo, Bruno Sinopoli, and Benjamin
Nkrumah. Modeling impact of attacks, recovery, and attackability conditions for
situational awareness. 2014 IEEE International Inter-Disciplinary Conference
on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support, CogSIMA
2014, pages 181–187, 2014.
[25] Michael Mayo. Learning Petri net models of non-linear gene interactions. BioSystems, 82(1):74–82, 2005.
[26] P Persis Glory, N.G. David, and J.D. Emerald. Petri Net Models and Non Linear
Genetic Diseases. In Bio-Inspired Computing: Theories and Applications (BICTA), 2010 IEEE Fifth International Conference on, pages 1466–1470, 2010.
[27] Yuji Ouchi and Eiichiro Tazaki. Learning and Reasoning Method Using Fuzzy
Coloured Petri Nets under Uncertainty. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1997.
Computational Cybernetics and Simulation., 1997 IEEE International Conference on, volume 4, pages 3867–3871, 1997.
[28] Lingyan Liu, Xiaoping Wu, and Luning Cui. A Dynamic Pattern Classifier for
Complex Information Systems Based on Fuzzy Petri Nets. 2008 Second International Symposium on Intelligent Information Technology Application, pages
583–587, 2008.
[29] S. Barzegar, M. Davoudpour, M. R. Meybodi, A. Sadeghian, and M. Tirandazian.
Formalized learning automata with adaptive fuzzy coloured Petri net; an application specific to managing traffic signals. Scientia Iranica, 18(3 D):554–565,
2011.
[30] D E Grochowski and Y Tang. A machine learning approach for optimal disassembly planning. International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing,
22(4):374–383, 2009.
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